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Chapter One embeds downward wage rigidity into a rational bubble model. We analytically
characterize how the collapse of bubbles can interact with wage rigidity to generate deep and
protracted recessions with involuntary unemployment, such as those in Japan or Spain.
Chapter Two develops a tractable bubbles model with financial friction and downward wage
rigidity. Competitive speculation in risky bubbles can result in excessive investment booms that
precede inefficient busts, where post-bubble aggregate economic activities collapse below the pre-
bubble trend. Risky bubbles can reduce ex-ante social welfare, and leaning-against-the-bubble
policies that balance the boom-bust trade-off can be warranted. We further show that the collapse
of a bubble can push the economy into a “secular stagnation” equilibrium, where the zero lower
bound and the nominal wage rigidity constraint bind, leading to a persistent recession, such as the
Japanese “lost decades.”
The link between boom-bust cycles in asset prices and business cycles has been well-documented,
but identifying and estimating the bubble component in asset prices remains a challenge. Chap-
ter Three develops an econometric model combining tools from the affine term structure literature
with state-of-the-art models from the rational bubble literature. Employing the FRED-MD monthly
database and the U.S. government bond term structure to identify the fundamental value of the S&P
500, along with a particle filter to estimate the bubble component, I find that this model framework
matches observed price dynamics very closely. Bubble growth is sensitive to aggregate state and
sentiment surprises, particularly with regard to consumer leverage. I apply the model to the current
debate regarding the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies for regulating bubbles. I show that
traditional contractionary interest rate policy inflates asset price bubbles, whereas a macropruden-
tial policy of leverage tightening deflates asset price bubbles. My framework provides a flexible
iii
environment for quantitatively studying bubble magnitude in a broad class of dividend-producing
assets and counterfactuals.
iv
To my dearest wife, Jaime. May we now be living out where the river bends. Where the
grass is green and the highway ends.
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CHAPTER 1
BUBBLES, WAGE RIGIDITY, AND PERSISTENT SLUMPS1
1.1 Intro
The collapse of asset and credit bubbles often precedes financial crises and protracted reces-
sions (Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor 2015), such as the “lost decades” following the collapse of
Japan’s housing bubble in 1991. However, understanding post-bubble crises and recessions re-
mains an open question for the general equilibrium bubble literature (see surveys by Barlevy 2012
and Miao 2014), as most existing models predict a relatively benign post-bubble transition. A stan-
dard prediction is that while bubbles give rise to economic booms, their collapse simply precedes a
gradual reversion to the pre-bubble trend while the economy retains full employment (e.g., Hirano
and Yanagawa 2016).
Our contribution is a tractable model where the collapse of bubbles can lead to a protracted
slump, or even a “hysteresis” – periods in which investment, output, and employment are per-
sistently below the pre-bubble trend. We embed downward wage rigidity (real or nominal, à-la
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2016) into an otherwise relatively standard rational bubble model (à-la
Martin and Ventura 2012a, 2016). Despite being a standard friction in New Keynesian models,
wage rigidity has been largely absent from bubble models. We show its presence leads to dras-
tically different post-bubble dynamics. As usual, bubbles in our model crowd in lending and
investment. However, their collapse causes a slump in which wages cannot flexibly fall and firms
have to cut employment, causing involuntary unemployment and a drop in net worth. This pro-
cess amplifies and propagates the effects of collapse. Figure 1.1’s top panel illustrates the model’s
dynamics (versus the standard dynamics with flexible wage).
Our model allows for analytical characterizations of the depth and duration of the slump. While
1This chapter is joint work with the following coauthors: Toan Phan.
a higher rate of credit creation leads to bigger bubbles and economic booms, it also causes a deeper
and longer recession after bubbles collapse. Additionally, we show that post-bubble inflation can
reduce the depth and duration of the recession, but deflation would exacerbate them. Overall,
by combining the rational-bubble and New Keynesian frameworks, our paper provides a new and
complementary perspective on long recessions (see, inter alia, Krugman 1998, Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Trabandt 2015).
The model’s predictions are largely consistent with Jordà et al. (2015)’s empirical evidence that
the combination of credit and asset bubbles increases crisis risks. They are also consistent with the
experiences of Japan in 1991 and Spain in 2008 (Figure 1.2). Both countries enjoyed sizable in-
creases in employment and real wages during the boom-phase of asset prices (in Japan’s late 1980s
and Spain’s early 2000s). However, when the booms turned into busts, real wages remained rigidly
high for many years while the the economies fell into recessions and unemployment substantially
increased.
1.2 Real Model
We start with a real model. Consider a deterministic overlapping generations economy where
agents live for two periods (called young and old).2 Agents consume when old and are risk-
neutral. Young agents earn labor income, borrow/lend, and accumulate capital with a technology
that transforms each unit of consumption good to ai units of capital, where the productivity ai can
take two possible values aH > aL > 0. The fraction of agents with productivity aH (the “high
type”) in each generation is fixed at µ ∈ (0, 1). Agents supply labor and capital to competitive
firms which produce the consumption good using a standard technology yt = kαt l
1−α
t , α ∈ (0, 1).
For simplicity, assume capital depreciates completely, the population of each generation is fixed at
one, and there is no exogenous TFP growth.
To model bubbles’ expansionary effect on capital, we assume bubble creation as in Martin and
Ventura (2016). Let Bt ≥ 0 denote the market value of the portfolio consisting of all bubbles in
t. Some of these bubbles, whose aggregate market value denoted by Boldt , are old since they were
2We interpret the overlapping generations structure as representing the entry and exit of entrepreneurs/investors,
and the duration of a period as the length of a loan contract.
2
initiated by previous generations and purchased by agents of generation (born in) t − 1. Some,
whose aggregate market value denoted by Bnewt , are new since they are initiated by agents of










, bnew,Lt ≡ 0
denote the value of new bubbles generated by each individual of generation t− 1.
Given labor incomewtlt, rental rate of capitalRkt+1, interest rateRt+1, and value of new bubbles
bnew,it+1 , an agent of generation t with productivity a
i ∈ {aH , aL} chooses capital accumulation





























Hence bubble creation increases the high type’s borrowing capacity, and can represent credit cre-
ation. We focus on equilibria in which the relative size of new bubbles is constant:
Bnewt = nBt,
3The result does not change if the collateral also includes old bubbles.
3
where n ∈ (0, 1) represents an exogenous rate of bubble (or credit) creation, and where (2.4) binds
for the high type.
Finally, we impose a downward real wage rigidity:4
wt ≥ γwt−1, (DWR)
where γ ∈ [0, 1] governs the degree of rigidity (γ = 0 implies full flexibility). Downward real wage
rigidity has been empirically documented (e.g., Babeckỳ, Du Caju, Kosma, Lawless, Messina, and
Rõõm 2010), and was present in Japan and Spain (Figure 1.2). The presence of rigid wages implies
that the labor market does not necessarily clear. In each t, each young agent inelastically supplies
one unit of labor, but the equilibrium employment lt (symmetric across agents) satisfies:
lt ≤ 1, (1.3)
and complementary-slackness:
(1− lt)(wt − γwt−1) = 1. (1.4)
(2.10) states that involuntary unemployment must be accompanied by a binding (DWR). Con-
versely, when (DWR) does not bind, the economy must be in full employment.












4Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016) impose a similar form of rigidity on local-currency wage and a fixed exchange
rate, which amount to a form of real rigidity as in (DWR).
4
where kt = µkHt + (1− µ)kLt is the aggregate capital stock; markets clear:
µdHt + (1− µ)dLt = 0
µxHt + (1− µ)xLt = 1 if Bt > 0,
and portfolio allocations solve (1.1). Initial B0 and k0 are given.
1.2.1 Bubble-less Steady State (SS)
Without bubbles (Bt ≡ 0,∀t), agents cannot borrow and lend, and all labor income is invested
in capital. Since (DWR) does not bind in SS, it is straightforward to characterize the bubble-less
SS by:
l̄ = 1,
w̄ = (1− α)k̄α,






k̄ = ((1− α)ā)
1
1−α , (1.6)
where ā ≡ µaH + (1− µ)aL.
1.2.2 Bubble SS
With bubbles, the high type can borrow (recall collateral constraint (2.4)). The equilibrium
interest rate satisfies aLRkt+1 ≤ Rt+1 ≤ aHRkt+1, as Rt+1 cannot be below the low type’s return
from capital (else the low type would not lend) or above the high type’s return from capital (else
the high type would not borrow). For simplicity, we focus on equilibria where aLRkt+1 = Rt+1
(i.e., constraint kLt+1 ≥ 0 does not bind).5 Then the low type’s optimization implies a no-arbitrage
5For a thorough analysis of equilibria where aLRkt+1 = Rt+1 vs. equilibria where a
LRkt+1 < Rt+1, see Ikeda and
Phan (2015).
5





= Rt+1 = a
LRkt+1. (1.7)
Since aHRkt+1 > Rt+1, the high type are credit-constrained and do not speculate in bubbles. Thus,





















− aLBt︸ ︷︷ ︸
crowd−out
. (1.8)
The last two terms in (1.8) show different effects of bubbles on capital. First, the crowd-in effect:
a higher rate of bubble creation n increases the low type’s ability to lend to the high type. Second,
the crowd-out effect: bubble speculation crowds out the flow from savings to capital accumulation.





so that the crowd-in effect dominates.
As (DWR) does not bind in SS, the deterministic bubble SS is characterized by:
lb = 1,
wb = (1− α)kαb ,
Rb = a















with aggregate bubble value:
B =
kb − āwb
(aH − aL) n
1−n − aL
.
B > 0 if and only if kb > āwb, or equivalently:






Hence, we impose the following necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a SS with
expansionary bubbles:










Suppose the economy is in the bubble SS, but bubbles unanticipatedly collapse at T (BT+s =
0, ∀s ≥ 0). As bubbles were expansionary, the post-bubble capital stock and wage will decline
towards the bubble-less SS levels.
Flexible wage: If wages are flexible (γ = 0), then the labor market clears and the economy

















This full-employment transition path is illustrated by the dashed lines in Figure 1.1’s top panel.
Rigid wage: However, if the downward wage rigidity constraint binds, then wage cannot flexi-
bly fall to clear the labor market, leading to involuntary unemployment. The contraction in employ-
ment reduces young agents’ net worth, which in turn reduces their ability to accumulate capital.
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The wage rigidity thus amplifies and propagates the shock of bursting bubbles. We can analytically
characterize the depth and duration of the post-bubble unemployment episode. Let
s∗ ≡ min{s ≥ 0|LT+s = 1},
then T + s∗ is the first post-bubble period when full employment is recovered. If s∗ > 0, then the
economy is said to be in a slump between T and T + s∗ − 1. Let
k∗ ≡ inf{kT+s : 0 ≤ s ≤ s∗}
be the recession’s trough.
Proposition 1. [Post-bubble slump]
1. During the slump, (DWR) binds:
wT+s = γ
swb, (1.12)




2 · kb, (1.13)




(1 − n) ∈ (0, 1), Γ ≡ γ− 1−αα ≥ 1, and involuntary unemployment is
positive:






kT+s > 0. (1.14)
After the slump (t ≥ T + s∗), the economy follows the full employment transition path to the
bubble-less SS.
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∞ if γ = 1
, (1.15)
k∗ = eζ · kb (1.16)
where dxe is the ceiling function and ζ(n, γ) ≡ inf{ s(s+1)
2
ln Γ + s ln η : 0 ≤ s ≤ s∗}.
Intuitively, the credit market shuts down after bubbles collapse, and the aggregate capital then
evolves according to kt+1 = āwtlt. However, wage is rigidly constrained by (1.12). Combined
with firms’ optimal hiring condition (2.7), this implies (1.13) and (1.14). The rest follows. Note in
(2.45) that in the extreme rigidity case of γ = 1, the economy never recovers from unemployment.
Proposition 1 implies k∗ and s∗ are monotone functions of γ and n. An increase in γ makes
wages more rigid, weakening the “recovery term” Γ
s(s+1)
2 in (1.13). An increase in bubble creation
rate n raises bubbles’ size, leading to a larger necessary post-bubble adjustment, i.e., a larger
“contractionary term” ηs in (1.13). Consequently, increases in n and/or γ will exacerbate the depth
and duration of the slump. Moreover, the economy can fall into a hysteresis (defined as k∗ < k̄),
where capital, employment, and output fall below the pre-bubble levels. Formally:
Corollary 2. [Comparative statics]
1. Slump duration s∗ is increasing in wage rigidity parameter γ and bubble/credit creation rate
n.
2. Trough k∗ is decreasing in γ and n.
3. Hysteresis (k∗ < k̄) occurs if and only if γ and n are sufficiently large that ζ(n, γ) < 0.
This result has an important implication. From an ex-ante perspective, a marginal increase in
bubble/credit creation n raises aggregate activities in the bubble SS. However, from an ex-post
perspective, the increase in n causes a deeper and longer recession. Hence, a macroprudential
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policymaker who can tax bubble creation or investment may face a time-inconsistency problem.
Future work can explore this problem.
Figure 1.1 summarizes the main results.
1.3 Nominal Rigidity
Our insights carry through to an environment with nominal instead of real rigidity. To fix ideas,
we introduce money through a cash-in-advance framework as in Krugman (1998). Suppose each





where Pt denotes the price level. We focus on equilibria where this constraint is binding. To avoid
distributional effects, we follow Asriyan, Fornaro, Martin, and Ventura (2016) and assume that
the monetary authority transfers the seignorage to a fiscal authority who uses it to finance useless
spending. Thus, monetary policy simply consists of setting the money supply to achieve a desired
inflation target.







where wt denotes real wage and Πt ≡ PtPt−1 . Constraint (2.53) implies that inflation (Πt > 1)
can reduce the “effective” degree of rigidity γ̂t ≡ γ/Πt. Formally, suppose for simplicity that the
authority sets a constant inflation target Π∗. Then:
Proposition 3. Monetary policy can restore full employment transition (1.11) if:
Π∗ ≥ max
{





Intuitively, by setting the inflation target above a certain threshold, the authority can prevent
binding nominal wage rigidity and post-bubble slumps. Equation (1.18) also shows that a higher
rigidity γ and bubble/credit creation rate n would raise the required threshold. In practice, many
factors could hinder policymakers ability to raise inflation, such as deflationary pressures (e.g.,
Eggertsson and Krugman 2012b) that are absent from our simple model. A monetary analysis that
combines our model and such deflationary pressures is left for future research.
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Figure 1.1: Transition dynamics of aggregate variables (relative to bubble-less steady state). The economy begins in the bubble-less SS.
Then bubbles unanticipatedly arise at t = 20. Capital, output and wage expand until the economy reaches the deterministic bubble SS.
Then bubbles unanticipatedly collapse at t = 100. If γ = 0, the economy flexibly transitions to the bubble-less SS (the dashed lines in top
panels); but if γ = 0.99, the economy falls into a slump with involuntary unemployment (the grey-dashed bar), as downwardly rigid wages
cannot decline fast enough, and post-bubble economic activities dip below the pre-bubble trend. The bottom panel shows how a larger n
leads to a larger boom but a deeper and more persistent bust. Parameters: α = 1
3
, aH = 1, aL = 1
2
, µ = 1
2
, and n = 0.7 (top panel),
γ = 0.99 (bottom panel).
12
Figure 1.2: Asset prices (left panels) and employment and wages (right panels) in Japan and Spain.
Dashed vertical lines indicate beginnings of post-bubble recessions (1991 for Japan and 2008 for
Spain). Grey bars indicate recessions, according to OECD. Real wages calculated from nominal






In the recent decades, many countries in the world, including Japan, the U.S., and several Eu-
ropean economies, have experienced episodes of rapid speculative booms and busts in asset prices
followed by declines in economic activities and in some cases persistent recessions. More gen-
erally, throughout history, the collapse of large asset and credit booms tend to precede recessions
and crises (e.g., Kindleberger and O’Keefe 2001; Jordà et al. 2015). These experiences have led
policymakers to be increasingly aware of the potential risks of asset price bubbles, leading to dis-
cussions of macroprudential regulations such as “leaning-against-the-wind” policies – preventive
measures to curb the booms in asset prices in order to mitigate the eventual busts.
However, despite the recent developments in the macroeconomic literature on asset bubbles,
relatively little theoretical framework has analyzed the potential efficiency trade-off between the
booms and busts of risky bubbly episodes and whether preventive policies are warranted. In partic-
ular, in most rational bubble models – the workhorse models to study the macroeconomic effects
of bubbles in general equilibrium – private agents correctly perceive the risk of speculating in a
bubbly asset and bubbles generally improve the efficiency of the financial system (Barlevy 2018a;
Miao 2014; Martin and Ventura 2017).
In this paper, we develop a tractable general equilibrium model to address the question of
when and how risky rational bubbles can lead to inefficiencies and evaluate the welfare trade-off.
We focus on the combination of financial friction and downward wage rigidities during bubbly
episodes. We posit an economy where entrepreneurial agents with heterogeneous productivity
accumulate capital and face financial friction that constrains their ability to borrow from each
1This chapter is joint work with the following coauthors: Siddhartha Biswas and Toan Phan.
other. If the credit and capital markets cannot satisfy the demand for savings, speculative bubbles
may arise. A rational bubble is an asset that is traded above its fundamental value; an agent
purchases the overvalued asset because he or she expects to be able to sell it later. We assume
bubbles are stochastic in the sense that in each period the price of the bubbly asset can collapse
to the fundamental value with an exogenous probability (e.g., Blanchard and Watson 1982a; Weil
1987).
The possibility of trading the bubbly asset facilitates the reallocation of resources across time,
because the bubbly asset can act as a savings vehicle. Trading also facilitates reallocation across
agents, because the bubbly asset increases entrepreneurs’ net worth and hence their ability to bor-
row. Thus, the boom in the price of a bubbly asset leads to a boom in entrepreneurial net worth,
credit, investment, output, wages, and consumption. When the boom finally turns into a bust, the
economy simply converges back to the pre-bubble economy. Therefore, with financial friction
alone, the model so far implies that speculative bubbles help to crowd in productive investment
and improve the overall efficiency of the economy, as implied in most existing expansionary bub-
ble frameworks (e.g., Hirano, Inaba, and Yanagawa 2015a; Miao and Wang 2018a).
However, the implications change with downward wage rigidities. When an expansionary
bubble collapses, the net worth of entrepreneurial agents also collapses, leading to contractions
in credit, investment, and labor demand. In a flexible labor market, wages will fall to clear the
labor market. However, we assume that (real) wages are downwardly rigid. Then there will be ra-
tioning in the labor market, resulting in involuntary unemployment. An increase in unemployment
can in turn lead to an endogenous and protracted recession by eroding the intertemporal alloca-
tion of resources. The drop in employment reduces the return to capital investment, which then
lowers entrepreneurs’ net worth. This further leads to a contraction in capital investment, since
entrepreneurs’ ability to borrow and invest depends critically on their net worth. Therefore, the
future capital stock will decline, causing further downward pressure on labor demand and wages,
thus reducing future capital accumulation. The vicious cycle continues until the capital stock has
fallen enough, often undershooting the bubbleless steady-state level.
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In short, our theory identifies the booms and busts of speculative bubbly episodes as an impor-
tant source of shocks that can potentially trigger a deep and persistent recession, such as the lost
decades in Japan or the Great Depression and Great Recession in the U.S. We further show that
when the bubble is sufficiently risky and the labor market is sufficiently rigid, society’s welfare
can be better off without bubbles. Our model thus provides a step toward bridging the views of
policymakers and theoretical models of bubbles (Barlevy 2018a). In particular, our theory nat-
urally implies that a “leaning-against-the-bubble” type of macroprudential policy intervention is
warranted for excessively large bubbles. The source of inefficiencies is a form of “bubbly pecu-
niary externality,” as individual investors do not internalize the effect of their portfolio choices in
driving a large bubbly boom, which will lead to a large bust.
Finally, we extend the real model to an environment where nominal wages are downwardly
rigid (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2016; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2017) and the central bank sets
the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor rule that is subject to the zero lower bound (ZLB).
We then show that the collapse of a large expansionary bubble triggers a sharp drop in the real
interest rate, pushing the nominal interest rate against the ZLB. Intuitively, by crowding in capital
investment, the bubble leads to an investment boom. Thus, after the bubble collapses, the economy
experiences an “investment overhang,” as it has too much capital relative to the bubbleless steady
state. The high capital stock implies a low marginal product of capital and a low real interest rate.
The collapse of a sufficiently large bubble can thus push the real interest rate so low that the ZLB
binds. We show that, under certain conditions, the post-bubble economy may fall into a “secular
stagnation” steady state, where employment and investment are persistently and inefficiently low
and inflation is below target. A vicious cycle can arise from the interaction between (i) a low inter-
est rate environment, which constrains the monetary authority from raising inflation, exacerbating
the nominal wage rigidity and unemployment problem and (ii) inefficient unemployment that low-
ers the marginal product of capital, which in turn lowers the interest rates. In the absence of other
shocks, this cycle can keep the economy in a persistent slump.
Related literature. By showing that collapse of risky bubbles can trigger inefficient recessions,
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our paper is related to several strands of the bubble literature. A large number of papers emphasize
the positive aspect of bubbles in reducing dynamic inefficiencies (e.g., Samuelson 1958; Dia-
mond 1965; Tirole 1985) or reducing allocative inefficiencies (e.g., Farhi and Tirole 2011; Miao
and Wang 2012a, 2018a; Martin and Ventura 2012a; Graczyk and Phan 2016; Ikeda and Phan
2019). Other papers emphasize potential ex-ante inefficiencies of speculative bubbles in diverting
resources away from productive investment (e.g., Saint-Paul 1992; Grossman and Yanagawa 1993;
King and Ferguson 1993; Hirano et al. 2015a), or generating excessive investment in certain sectors
(e.g., Cahuc and Challe 2012; Miao, Wang, and Zhou 2015a), excessive volatility (Caballero and
Krishnamurthy 2006; Ikeda and Phan 2016), or excessive default (Kocherlakota 2009a; Barlevy
2014; Bengui and Phan 2016).
In highlighting the adverse effects of collapsing bubbles in an environment with wage rigidity,
our paper complements the work by Miao and Wang (2015a) who show that in an environment
with bubbles in bank values, collapsing bubbles can trigger a sharp contraction in bank lending
and push economic activities below the pre-bubble trend.
Our framework is related to a growing literature on monetary models with bubbles, including
the infinite-lived agent models of Dong, Miao, and Wang (2017), Ikeda (2016), and Hirano, Ikeda,
and Phan (2017), and the overlapping generation models of Gali (2014a, 2016), Asriyan et al.
(2016), and Hanson and Phan (2017a). Our paper complements this literature by showing that the
combination of an expansionary bubble and downward nominal wage rigidity can cause a post-
bubble liquidity trap.
Our paper is also related to a large macroeconomic literature that investigates the causes of
liquidity traps, notably deleveraging shocks (e.g., Eggertsson and Krugman 2012b; Korinek and
Simsek 2016; Buera and Nicolini 2017) and shocks to inflation expectations (e.g., Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe 2017) or idiosyncratic risk (e.g., Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno 2014; Acharya and
Dogra 2018). The buildup of an expansionary bubble in our model provides a microfoundation
to the investment overhang in Rognlie, Shleifer, and Simsek (2014), and its collapse provides a
microfoundation for the deleverage shocks in Eggertsson and Krugman (2012b).
Finally, by analyzing macroprudential policies on speculative bubbles, our paper complements
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Biljanovska, Gornicka, and Vardoulakis (2019a) and contributes to the literature on macropru-
dential policies (e.g., Lorenzoni 2008; Olivier and Korinek 2010; He and Krishnamurthy 2011;
Bianchi 2011; Eberly and Krishnamurthy 2014; Farhi and Werning 2016; Bianchi and Mendoza
2018).
2.2 Model
Consider an economy with two types of goods: a perishable consumption good and a capital
good. There are two types of agents, called entrepreneurs and workers, each with constant unit







where the period utility function is u(c) = log(c), β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, and
E0(·) is the expected value conditional on information in period 0.
2.2.1 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs are the only producers of the capital good. They rent the capital produced to
firms through a competitive capital rental market. They face idiosyncratic productivity shocks: in
each period, an entrepreneur receives a random productivity shock a, where a is independently and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to a continuous distribution with a cumulative distribution
function (CDF) denoted by F .2 For tractability, we assume that the distribution is Pareto over
[1,∞) with shape parameter σ. In order for the distribution to have a finite mean, we assume
σ > 1.
We denote the set of entrepreneurs by J ≡ [0, 1]. After knowing the idiosyncratic productivity
2As is well-known among models with heterogeneous productivity shocks (e.g., Carlstrom and Fuerst 1997;
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999; Kocherlakota 2009a; Liu and Wang 2014), the i.i.d. assumption helps keep
the model tractable. A model with persistent idiosyncratic shocks can only be solved numerically.
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where Ijt is the investment in units of the consumption good in period t, k
j
t+1 is the amount of the
capital good produced in the subsequent period, and ajt is the productivity of the entrepreneur. For
tractability, we assume capital depreciates completely after being used in each period (we relax
this assumption in the Online Appendix and in the numerical analysis).
Following the bubbles literature (e.g., Tirole 1985), we assume there is a durable and perfectly
divisible financial asset in fixed unit supply that does not generate any dividend. In an equilibrium,
which we call the bubbleless equilibrium, the asset will be priced at its fundamental value of zero.
In some other equilibria, which we call bubbly equilibria, the asset will have a positive price. Let
bjt denote a share of the asset held by entrepreneur j and pbt be the price per unit of the asset. Then




















where Rt−1,t is the gross interest rate between t − 1 and t, dit is the amount of net borrowing in
period t, andRkt is the rental rate of capital in t. The left-hand side of this budget constraint consists
of expenditure on consumption, capital investment, and the purchase of financial asset. The right-
hand side is the available funds at date t, which consists of the return from capital investment in
the previous period, new net borrowing minus the net debt repayment, and the return from selling
the financial asset. Agents cannot invest a negative amount in the capital stock or the asset, i.e.,3
Ijt , b
j
t ≥ 0,∀t. (2.2)
3As otherwise, the ability to short sell would let agents borrow and bypass credit constraint (2.4).
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The entrepreneur’s net worth at the beginning of period t is











Following Moll (2014), we assume that due to financial friction, entrepreneurs can finance at










In general, a larger θ can be interpreted as representing an environment with less financial friction.
This type of simple credit constraint has been used extensively in recent general equilibrium mod-
els with heterogeneous agents (e.g., Banerjee and Moll 2010; Buera and Shin 2013), and it allows
us to get analytical solutions to the model.
The optimization problem of each entrepreneur j is as follows. In each period after knowing
her productivity shock ajt , the entrepreneur chooses consumption c
j
t , capital investment I
j
t , net debt
position djt (where a negative d
j




t−1. Her objective is





, subject to budget constraint (2.1),
nonnegativity constraint (2.2), and credit constraint (2.4).
2.2.2 Workers
Workers do not have access to capital production technologies. For simplicity, we assume
workers are hand to mouth, i.e.,
cwt = wtlt, (2.5)
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where wt is the wage rate and lt is the employment level per worker.4
2.2.3 Firms
In each period, there is a continuum of competitive firms that produce the consumption good






1−α, 0 < α < 1,
where kit and l
i
t are capital and labor inputs of a representative firm i. Competitive factor prices are













where Kt and Lt are the aggregate capital stock and employment.
2.2.4 Downward wage rigidity (DWR)
We assume that real wages are downwardly rigid:
wt ≥ γwt−1,∀t ≥ 1, (2.8)
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is a constant parameter that governs the degree of rigidity. The condition states
that the real wage cannot fall below a certain fraction of the real wage in the last period.5
The presence of rigid wages implies that the labor market does not necessarily clear. In each
4Alternatively, we can assume workers cannot borrow against their future labor income. Thus the optimization
problem of workers is to maximize lifetime utility E0 (
∑∞
t=0 β





t = wtlt + d
w
t −Rtdwt−1 + pbtbwt−1,
and dwt ≤ 0 and bwt ≥ 0. In equilibrium, it can be shown that workers will be effectively hand to mouth, i.e., cwt = wtlt.
Intuitively, due to financial friction, the interest rate (and the returns from bubble speculation) will be too low relative
to the discount factor, and thereby it will be suboptimal for workers to save or to buy the bubbly asset (see Hirano et al.
2015a for more details).
5For empirical evidence of real wage rigidity, see, e.g., Holden and Wulfsberg (2009) and Babeckỳ et al. (2010).
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period, even though each worker inelastically supplies one unit of labor, the realized employment
Lt per worker in equilibrium is determined by two conditions: a feasibility constraint:
Lt ≤ 1, (2.9)
and a complementary-slackness condition:
(1− Lt) (wt − γwt−1) = 0. (2.10)
These equations state that involuntary unemployment (Lt < 1) must be accompanied by a binding
wage rigidity (2.8). Conversely, when (2.8) is slack, the economy must be in full employment
(Lt = 1). For simplicity, we also assume that in the initial period t = 0, the legacy wage w−1 is
sufficiently small so that the labor market clears in t = 0.
2.2.5 Equilibrium
Definition. Given initial kj0 = K0, d
j
0 = 0, b
j
0 = 1, p
b
0, a competitive equilibrium consists of prices






t}j∈J , cwt , Kt+1, Lt}t≥0 such that:
• Entrepreneurs and firms optimize,
• The consumption of a representative worker is given by (2.5),
























• Labor market conditions (2.8), (2.9), and (2.10) hold
As usual, a steady state is an equilibrium where quantities, prices (in units of the consumption
good), and inflation are time invariant.
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2.3 Bubbleless benchmark
Let us first analyze the bubbleless equilibrium, where the price of the financial asset is equal to
its fundamental value of zero, i.e., pbt = 0 for all t. Details of the derivations are relegated to the
Online Appendix.
2.3.1 Optimal decisions of individual entrepreneurs
In each period t, given the realization of her productivity shock ajt , each entrepreneur j chooses
cjt , I
j
t , and d
j
t . Since the period utility function is logarithmic, the optimal action for the en-
trepreneur is to consume a fraction 1− β of her net worth ejt :
cjt = (1− β)e
j
t , (2.11)

















Both the savings options of investing in capital and lending in the credit market are riskless.
Hence, the entrepreneur will simply choose the option that offers the highest rate of return. Lending
yields a rate of return Rt,t+1, which is the same for all entrepreneurs. Capital investment yields
a rate of return ajtRkt+1, which varies according to each entrepreneur’s productivity a
j
t . Hence, in
equilibrium, there is a cutoff productivity threshold āt in each period such that: all entrepreneurs
with ajt < āt will only lend and not invest in capital (i.e., the constraint I
j
t ≥ 0 binds), while those
with ajt > āt will only invest in capital and borrow as much as possible (i.e., credit constraint (2.4)
binds). Entrepreneurs with ajt = āt (the “marginal investors”) will be indifferent between lending
and investing in capital, and their djt and I
j
t are indeterminate. The indifference condition yields a
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Their capital investment is given by:
Ijt =









and the amount of capital produced by each entrepreneur in t+ 1 is given by:
kjt+1 =










Given the decisions of individual entrepreneurs, we can characterize the aggregate equilibrium









The cutoff threshold āt is determined by the credit market clearing condition
∫ 1
0
djtdj = 0. By
incorporating equations (2.13), (2.14), (2.15), and the assumption of i.i.d. productivity shocks, this
6We ignore the indeterminate case of ajt = āt, as it happens with probability zero.
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condition can be rewritten as (see the Online Appendix):








dF (a) · βet︸ ︷︷ ︸
agg. credit demand
, (2.18)
where the left-hand side is the aggregate supply of credit (from entrepreneurs with ajt < āt) and
the right-hand side is the aggregate demand of credit (from entrepreneurs with ajt > āt). By
canceling the βet term on both sides, we get a simple equation that determines āt = ān, which is




(1− F (ān)) . (2.19)
Given that F is the CDF of a Pareto distribution over [1,∞) with shape parameter σ, this equation







The cutoff threshold is a proxy for allocation efficiency. Intuitively, a greater ān is associated with
less financial friction (a greater θ), implying more resources can be allocated to a more productive
set of entrepreneurs. When θ → 0, the credit market shuts down, and ān → 1, which is the lower
bound of the distribution, implying that even the least productive entrepreneurs invest in capital.
When θ → 1, there is no financial friction, and ān →∞, as only the most productive entrepreneurs
invest in capital.
Given the cutoff threshold, the evolution of the aggregate capital stock can be derived from









adF (a) · αKαt L1−αt . (2.21)
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Finally, the aggregate employment and equilibrium wage are determined by labor market condi-
tions (2.8), (2.9), and (2.10).
2.3.3 Bubbleless steady state
Given the equilibrium dynamics, the steady state with no bubbles can be derived as follows.
Because of the assumption that the rigidity parameter is a constant γ ≤ 1, the downward wage
rigidity condition (2.8) does not bind in steady state, leading to full employment:
Ln = 1. (2.22)
















In summary, equations (2.20), (2.22), (2.23), and (2.25) uniquely determine the bubbleless steady
state.
2.4 Bubbly equilibrium
We now analyze a stochastic bubbly equilibrium, where the financial asset is priced above its
fundamental value of zero. The asset thus plays the role of a (pure) bubbly asset, as in Tirole
(1985). Note that in practice, bubbles are typically attached to stock and housing assets; it is,
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however, difficult to model such bubbles in the infinite-horizon framework (see Miao and Wang
2018a and the related estimated model in Miao, Wang, and Xu 2015a).
To model a stochastic bubble, we follow the literature (e.g., Weil 1987) and focus on equilibria
where in each period the bubble persists (pbt > 0) with a probability ρ ∈ (0, 1) and permanently
collapses (pbt+j = 0,∀j ≥ 0)7 with the complementary probability 1− ρ, where a lower ρ means a
riskier bubble. The two sources of uncertainty in the model are thus the idiosyncratic productivity
shock and the aggregate bubble shock that makes the bubble collapse. We focus on the relevant
parameter range in which the DWR is slack as long as the bubble persists. Detailed derivations are
relegated to the Online Appendix.
2.4.1 While the bubble persists
Optimal decisions of individual entrepreneurs
Suppose the bubble persists in t, i.e., pbt > 0. Then, while the optimal consumption of each
entrepreneur is still a fraction 1 − β of net worth as in equation (2.11), her portfolio optimization










On the one hand, the savings options of investing in capital and lending yield riskless returns
of ajtRkt+1 and Rt,t+1, respectively. As in the bubbleless benchmark, the bubbly equilibrium will
feature a cutoff productivity threshold āt in each period such that: all entrepreneurs with produc-
tivity shocks below this threshold will not invest in capital (i.e., the constraint Ijt ≥ 0 binds), and
all those with productivity shocks above it will only invest in capital, sell all of their assets, and
borrow as much as possible (i.e., the credit constraint binds). Thus, the entrepreneurial capital
investment decision and the amount of capital produced are given by equations (2.15) and (2.16),
respectively, as in the bubbleless benchmark.
On the other hand, the speculative investment in the bubbly asset yields a risky return that is
7That is, once collapsed, bubbles are not expected to reemerge. As in Guerron-Quintana, Hirano, and Jinnai (2018),
the model can be extended to relax this assumption and allow for recurring bubbles.
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zero with probability 1 − ρ. In the bubbly equilibrium, the less productive entrepreneurs must be
willing to both lend and purchase the bubbly assets, and so they must be indifferent between the

























0 if ajt > āt
, (2.27)










= 0, if ajt < āt. (2.28)









= 0, if ajt = āt. (2.29)

















Intuitively, the bubbly asset provides an additional investment vehicle for entrepreneurs. When
they are less productive, they can invest in the bubbly asset. Then when they become more pro-
ductive, they sell the asset in order to make more capital investment.







t = 0. In a representative agent model, this condition can be used to
rule out the possibility of bubbles (e.g., Kamihigashi 2001). Intuitively, the condition imposes that
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the present discounted value of the individual investment in the bubbly asset pbtb
j
t must be zero. In
a representative model, because bjt = bt = 1, this condition implies that the present discounted
value of the total value of the bubbly asset pbt must be zero. However, with heterogeneous en-
trepreneurs and occasionally binding credit constraints, the individual bubbly investment is not the
same as the total value of the bubbly asset (pbtb
j
t 6= pbt), because entrepreneurs have heterogeneous
bubbly investment positions (recall equation (2.27)). Therefore, in a heterogeneous agent model
with incomplete markets like ours (or Kocherlakota 2009a and Hirano and Yanagawa 2016), the
individual transversality condition does not rule out the possibility of bubbles in equilibrium (see
Kocherlakota 1992b for a more general exposition of this point).
Aggregation
Aggregate variables of the bubbly economy evolve as follows. The aggregate net worth of











The right-hand side of this equation highlights the bubble’s crowd-in effect: the bubble resale value
pbt helps increase the net worth of entrepreneurs in equilibrium.
The cutoff threshold āt is determined by the credit market clearing condition
∫ 1
0
djtdj = 0, or
equivalently (see the Online Appendix):





· (1− F (āt)) · βet︸ ︷︷ ︸
agg. credit demand
.
The left-hand side of this equation highlights the bubble’s crowd-out effect: the aggregate specu-
lative investment in the bubbly asset (pbt) crowds out the flow from aggregate savings (F (āt)βet)
into the supply side of the credit market. By canceling et on both sides and defining the bubble






the equation above can be rewritten as
F (āt)− φt =
θ
1− θ
· (1− F (āt)) . (2.31)
Note that φt necessarily lies in (0, 1).



















Furthermore, indifference conditions (2.28) and (2.29) determine the interest rate and the growth



















Finally, the aggregate employment and equilibrium wage are determined by labor market condi-
tions (2.8), (2.9), and (2.10).
Stochastic bubbly steady state
We now characterize the stochastic bubbly steady state. Credit-clearing condition (2.31) im-
plies the bubble ratio φ as a function of āb:
F (āb)− φ =
θ
1− θ
· (1− F (āb)) . (2.35)
The only difference between equation (2.35) and its counterpart (2.19) in the bubbleless bench-
mark is the presence of φ on the left-hand side, representing the fact that in the bubbly economy,
relatively less productive entrepreneurs have the bubbly asset as an additional investment vehicle
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The fact that φ > 0 implies āb > ān. Thus, even though at the individual level entrepreneurs
may not see an advantage of having a bubble, at the aggregate level the buying and selling of the
bubbly asset allows for more resources to be transferred from less productive to more productive
entrepreneurs. The bubble causes the productivity threshold to rise from ān to āb, reflecting a more
efficient allocation. As a consequence, the average entrepreneurial productivity is higher during a
bubbly episode which is consistent with empirical observations (Miao and Wang 2012a).
As in the bubbleless steady state, given the assumption that the rigidity parameter is a constant
γ ≤ 1, the downward wage rigidity condition (2.8) does not bind in steady state, leading to:
Lb = 1. (2.37)
































θ + σ (1− θ) (1− ρ)
. (2.40)
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Equations (2.36) to (2.40) characterize the endogenous variables in the stochastic bubbly steady
state. Given (2.40), the condition for the existence of a bubbly steady state can be characterized as
follows:




Proof. For the variables characterized by equations (2.36) to (2.40) to constitute a bubbly steady
state, a necessary and sufficient condition is the bubble ratio satisfies φ ∈ (0, 1). From (2.40),
φ > 0 equivalent to 1 − (1 − βρ)σ > 0, i.e., (2.41). And once this condition is satisfied, it is
immediately true that φ < 1.
The condition implies that for a stochastic bubble to exist, the probability that the bubble per-
sists ρ has to be sufficiently high (as otherwise agents in the economy would deem the bubble to
be too risky as an investment vehicle). Another direct corollary of (2.40) and (2.41) is that φ is
strictly increasing in θ, implying that a more relaxed credit constraint is associated with a larger
bubble size in equilibrium.
For the rest of the paper, we will impose the bubble existence condition (2.41). Furthermore,
as in the recent literature, we will focus on the relevant range of parameters in which the bubble is
expansionary (the crowd-in effect dominates the crowd-out effect in steady state), that is,
Kb > Kn, (2.42)
where the stochastic bubbly steady-state capital stock Kb is given by (2.38) and the bubble-less
steady-state capital Kn is given by (2.23).8




We now study the effect of the collapse of the bubble on the economy, which is the main
focus of the paper. Suppose the bubble collapses at a certain period T , i.e., pbT+s = 0, ∀s ≥ 0.
As the expansionary effect of the bubble ends, the post-bubble capital stock and wage will decline
toward the bubbleless steady-state levels. However, if the downward wage rigidity constraint binds,
then the wage cannot flexibly fall to clear the labor market. Instead, employment is determined
by the demand of firms. The rigidly high wage thus leads to involuntary unemployment. The
contraction in employment reduces the return from capital and entrepreneurs’ net worth. Both
of these effects in turn reduce entrepreneurs’ accumulation of capital. The wage rigidity thus
amplifies and propagates the shock of bursting bubbles.
Let T + s∗ be the first post-bubble period when full employment is recovered, i.e.,
s∗ ≡ min{s ∈ N|LT+s = 1},
where N ≡ {0, 1, 2, . . . }. If s∗ > 0, then we say the economy is in a slump between T + 1 and
T + s∗ − 1, as there is involuntary unemployment during this period. Given the tractability of
the model, we can analytically characterize the duration of the slump. Intuitively, the economy
escapes the slump when the equilibrium wage has fallen enough that the downward wage rigidity
no longer binds.
Proposition 6. [Post-bubble slump] Suppose the bubble collapses in period T . Then the economy











swT , ∀0 ≤ s < s∗, (2.44)
















where the ceiling function dxe denotes the least integer greater than or equal to x. The economy
regains full employment and follows the dynamics of Section 2.3 for t ≥ T + s∗.
Proof. By the labor market clearing conditions during the slump, the wage rigidity must bind in
all periods for which LT+s < 1. Thus, during the slump, the equilibrium wage is given by (2.44).























By substituting in (2.7) and LT = 1 for wT , we then get (2.43), as desired.
To determine the duration s∗ of the slump, recall
s∗ ≡ min {s ∈ N | LT+s = 1}
= min
{
s ∈ N | wfT+s ≥ γwT+s−1
}
,
where wfT+s = (1− α)KαT+s represents the wage level consistent with full employment. Then we
can rewrite s∗ as:
s∗ = min
{
s ∈ N | (1− α)KαT+s ≥ γswT
}
.
Algebraic manipulation yields (2.45).
Numerical illustration
We conduct a simple calibrated numerical exercise to illustrate the equilibrium dynamics. Since
the model is intentionally designed to be stylized and parsimonious, this exercise should not be
viewed as a full-fledged quantitative analysis but rather a suggestive quantitative illustration of the
model’s predictions. In this section, we also make two basic extensions to improve the mapping
of the model to data: first, we assume the economy grows at an exogenous rate g ≥ 0; second, we
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assume capital partially depreciates at rate δ ∈ [0, 1] (see the Online Appendix for details).
We then calibrate the model to Japanese data as follows. We will choose parameters to match
the pre-bubble phase (1970-1986) and the boom phase (the bubble period of 1987-1991) and let
the model predict the bust phase (post-1991). There are two sets of parameters, the first of which
can be set using relatively standard values from the literature. Specifically, we set a period to be a
year, the capital share to be α = 0.33, the discount factor to be β = 0.96, the capital depreciation
rate to be δ = 0.076, and the exogenous growth rate to be g = 0.04. Following Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2016), the downward wage rigidity parameter is set to be close to one: γ = 0.961.
The second set of parameters, consisting of shape parameter σ of the productivity distribution, the
financial friction parameter θ, and the bubble persistence parameter ρ, are less standard and will be
calibrated. In particular, we choose σ, θ, and ρ to match Rn, KnYn , and
Kb+pb
Yb
to three moments: the
average real interest rate of 1.02 in Japan in the pre-bubble phase, the wealth-over-income ratios
in the pre-bubble phase and in the bubble phase of 3.67 and 5.18, respectively.9 The calibrated
parameter values are σ = 17.089, θ = 0.096, and ρ = 0.999.
Figure 2.1 illustrates a simulated equilibrium path for detrended aggregate variables under this
parametrization. On this path, we set the economy at the stochastic bubbly steady state in the initial
period, and then the bubble collapses in t = 10 (in the simulation, agents rationally expect that the
bubble is stochastic and can burst in any period). Equilibrium variables are plotted with the solid
lines, and for comparison, the bubbleless steady state counterparts are plotted with dashed lines. As
seen in the figure, as long as the bubble lasts, the economy experiences a boom in entrepreneurial
net worth (relative to the bubbleless steady state), which leads to a boom in aggregate credit to
entrepreneurs and consequently a boom in aggregated capital accumulation, output, wage, and
consumption.10 Since the boom in the capital stock and bubble value is larger than that in output,
9Data for the wealth-over-income ratios come from Piketty and Zucman (2014); data for GDP and real interest rate
come from the World Bank; the dating of the bubble period is according to Shioji (2013).
10Note that the boom in consumption is more pronounced for entrepreneurs, implying that entrepreneurs tend to gain
more from the bubble than workers (as the increase in net worth allows entrepreneurs to increase their investment).
This asymmetry could lead to interesting political economy implications, which are absent from this model and are
left for future research.
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the wealth over output ratio also increases during the bubbly episode.
However, after the bubble collapses, the economy begins a contraction. Without nominal rigidi-
ties, the labor market would be flexible and the equilibrium wage would simply decline back to the
bubbleless steady-state level. However, with downward wage rigidity, the post-bubble equilibrium
wage may not flexibly fall to clear the labor market, leading to involuntary unemployment. The
drop in employment not only reduces the economy’s output, but also has important intertemporal
effects. First, it reduces the net worth of entrepreneurs. Second, it reduces the return rate on cap-
ital. Both of these effects depress capital accumulation, explaining the contractions of aggregate
economic activities during the slump with involuntary unemployment.
As a consequence, aggregate output, net worth, capital, credit, and consumption can undershoot
(i.e., drop below) the pre-bubble trend. The figure highlights the boom-bust trade-off: the bubble
leads to a boom of about 2.1% in output (relative to the bubbleless steady state) as long as it
persists, but its collapse leads to a recession, where the aggregate output drops as much as 1.0%
below the bubbleless steady state. The economy experiences long “lost decades”: about 20 years
of declining output, which only recovers to its bubbleless trend after about 40 years.
2.5 Welfare and policy analysis
We will now investigate the welfare effects of stochastic bubbles. We define welfare as the
steady state lifetime expected utility.
2.5.1 Workers





log [(1− α)Kαn ]
1− β
. (2.46)
The welfare of workers in the stochastic bubbly steady state features a boom-bust trade-off.
As long as the bubble persists, their consumption is larger than that in the bubbleless steady state:
cwb = (1 − α)Kαb > cwn = (1 − α)Kαn . However, after the bubble collapses, the economy enters a














































Figure 2.1: Equilibrium dynamics with bubble boom-bust. Solid lines represent detrended equilib-
rium variable values; gray dashed horizontal lines represent the corresponding bubbleless steady-
state values.
Appendix, we show that the welfare of workers in the stochastic bubbly steady state is given by:
Wb =
log [(1− α)Kαb ]
1− ρβ︸ ︷︷ ︸






∗) logKb]︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected utility after bubble collapses
, (2.47)
where the expressions for Γ0 and Γ1 are provided in the Online Appendix.
It is clear that Wb depends on the bubble’s risk of bursting 1 − ρ and on the duration of the
post-bubble slump s∗, which is itself a function of the degree of wage rigidity γ (recall (2.45)).
Since the slump length s∗ is increasing in the degree of rigidity γ, Wb is decreasing in γ. Similarly,
Wb is increasing in the persistence probability ρ, i.e., a safer bubble yields a higher payoff.
2.5.2 Entrepreneurs
The welfare of entrepreneurs is more complex, due to their heterogeneity and portfolio opti-
mization. In the bubbleless steady state, the lifetime expected utility of an entrepreneur j who
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+ β F (ān)Vn(Rnβe
j)︸ ︷︷ ︸










dF (a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
continuation value if aj>ān
. (2.48)
The Online Appendix provides an analytical solution to this equation. To streamline the analysis,
let us assume that each entrepreneur starts the bubbleless steady state with an equal net worth,
leading to ej = αKαn . Then the bubbleless steady state entrepreneurial welfare is simply given by:
Vn ≡ Vn(αKαn ).
Similarly, in the bubbly steady state, lifetime expected utility of an entrepreneur j that starts


















































where Vburst(·) denotes the continuation value after the bubble bursts. The Online Appendix pro-
vides analytical solutions to Vb(·) and Vburst(·).
As in the bubbleless case, we assume for simplicity that each entrepreneur starts the bubbly
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steady state with an equal net worth, leading to ej = αK
α
b
1−βφ . Then the bubbly steady state en-







From Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2, we can show that if the bubble is sufficiently risky and if there
is sufficient wage rigidity, then agents in the economy are better off if there were no stochastically
bursting bubbles. This is intuitive as the welfare gain from a short and small boom (because ρ is
small) is dominated by the loss from a long and severe post-bubble slump (because γ is large).
Proposition 7. [Welfare-reducing stochastic bubble] Hold ρ fixed and assume ρ < ρ̄ ≡ 1− α(1−β)
2
β(β−α)
(the bubble is sufficiently risky). There exists γ̄ ∈ (0, 1) such that if γ > γ̄ (wage is sufficiently
rigid), then the bubble reduces steady-state welfare:11
Wb < Wn, Vb < Vn.
Proof. Appendix B.1.1.
2.5.3 Leaning-against-the-bubble policy
The fundamental source of inefficiencies in the model is a form of “bubbly pecuniary external-
ity”: individual entrepreneurs do not internalize the general equilibrium effects of their portfolio
choices in driving a boom in asset prices. Under this context, policy responses are warranted. We
analyze a macroprudential policy of taxing bubble speculation, so that private agents internalize
the pecuniary externality. As we will show, this policy has an effect of reducing the bubble size
and is thus akin to the kind of “leaning-against-the-wind” policies that have been extensively dis-
cussed in the policy circle (e.g., Barlevy 2012, 2018a) and is similar to the type of tax policies often
considered in the macroprudential literature (e.g., Lorenzoni 2008; Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto
11As a simple numerical illustration, assuming α = 0.33, β = 0.96, then the proposition implies that if γ = 1
(wages cannot decline), then agents in the economy will be better off without any stochastic bubble with the probability
of persisting ρ smaller than ρ̄ = 0.999.
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2012; Jeanne and Korinek 2013).12
Formally, consider a benevolent constrained policymaker who cares about the welfare of both
workers and entrepreneurs. Throughout, we assume that the policymaker takes the bubble risk
ρ as given, i.e., it cannot select a less risky bubbly equilibrium. Furthermore, the constrained
policymaker cannot undo the friction in the credit market (e.g., via redistribution) nor undo friction
in the labor market. However, it can levy a tax τ on the return from bubble speculation. As our





















The after-tax return on bubble speculation for the entrepreneur is then (1− τ)pbt+1/pbt . The policy-
maker rebates the tax revenue back to the entrepreneur through a lump-sum transfer:





which the entrepreneur takes as given.
Remark 8. Consistent with the aforementioned notion of constrained policymaking, this specifi-
cation of tax and transfer implies that the policymaker cannot redistribute resources across en-
trepreneurs or between entrepreneurs and workers. The reason we rule out redistribution policies
is as follows. There are two sources of inefficiencies in our model: (i) the pecuniary externality in
the speculative bubbly investment, and (ii) the misallocation due to heterogeneous productivities
and financial friction. The way we model a constrained macroprudential policymaker, who can
impose a macroprudential tax on speculative investment but cannot redistribute, ensures that the
sole objective of the macroprudential policy is to correct for the pecuniary externality, which is
12As in most of the literature, we implicitly assume that policymakers can observe the bubble. Of course, this is
a strong assumption. Alternatively, one can interpret the macroprudential policy as imposing a tax on speculative
investments in broad classes of assets that are ex ante perceived to be likely to experience bubbles, such as real estate
or stocks of certain types of companies.
40
the focus of the paper. This assumption allows us to zoom in on the effect of the macroprudential
policy on the pecuniary externality, in the same spirit as the pecuniary externality literature (e.g.,
Farhi and Werning 2016).
The Online Appendix derives the bubbly equilibrium dynamics and steady state with the tax.





· 1− σ(1− βρ(1− τ)))
θ − σρ (1− θ) (1− τ) + σ (1− τ − θ)
≤ φ. (2.52)
When τ = 0, the bubble size collapses to φ(0) = φ, which is the laissez-faire size as derived in
Section 2.4. Hence, the tax not only makes the bubble smaller, but also makes the bubble harder to




which is more stringent than the laissez-faire existence condition (2.41). Thus, by setting τ ≥ τ̄ ≡
1− σ−1
βσρ
, the policymaker can effectively rule out the possibility of a bubbly equilibrium.13
Figure 2.2 illustrates an equilibrium path with and without the tax. The dashed lines represent
the laissez-faire equilibrium path (as plotted in Figure 2.1), while the solid lines represent the
economy under a macroprudential tax of τ = 1%. As shown in the figure, the tax effectively
reduces the bubble size. There is a boom-bust trade-off: the policy mitigates the effects of a
collapsing bubble (the slump is shorter and less severe), but it also reduces the boom in aggregate
economic activities while the bubble lasts.
To evaluate the policy, the Online Appendix also derives the bubbly steady-state welfare expres-
sions for both workers and entrepreneurs under the tax, denoted by Wb(τ) and Vb(τ), respectively.
Assume the policymaker assigns a Pareto weight λ ∈ [0, 1] on the welfare of workers (and 1−λ on
the welfare of entrepreneurs). Given a fixed ρ, a constrained optimal policy is a macroprudential















































Figure 2.2: Equilibrium dynamics with bubble boom-bust. Solid and dashed lines represent de-
trended equilibrium variable values with and without tax, respectively; gray dashed horizontal lines
represent the corresponding bubbleless steady-state values.
tax τ that maximizes the Pareto-weighted bubbly steady-state welfare:14
max
τ≤τ̄
λWb(τ) + (1− λ)Vb(τ).
Due to the highly nonlinear behaviors of Wb and Vb, in general the optimal tax can only be
solved for with numerical methods. However, an interesting implication of our previous analysis
is that when the conditions of Proposition 7 are met, an optimal policy is to rule out the possibility
of the bubble altogether by setting τ = τ̄ . Formally:
Corollary 9. There exists γ̄ ∈ (0, 1) such that if there is sufficient wage rigidity (γ ≥ γ̄) and the
bubble is sufficiently risky (ρ < ρ̄ ≡ 1− α(1−β)
2
β(β−α) ), then a constrained-optimal macroprudential tax
14It is straightforward to show that a constrained-optimal policy implements a constrained-efficient allocation, where




τ = τ̄ ,
which effectively rules out the possibility of a bubble.
Proof. Appendix B.1.2.
2.6 Zero lower bound
We now extend the real model by introducing downward nominal wage rigidity (DWNR) and
a nominal interest rule that is constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB). We will show that the
collapse of a large bubble can push the interest rate against the ZLB and the push economy into a
“secular stagnation.”
DNWR: Formally, let Pt denote the price level of the consumption good in period t in unit of
a currency and let wt continue to denote the real wage. Instead of the real wage rigidity condi-
tion (2.8), we impose the following assumption on nominal wages (à-la Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
2017):
Ptwt ≥ γ(Lt)Pt−1wt−1,∀t ≥ 1,
where the degree of rigidity γ is now a function of Lt:
γ(L) ≡ γ0Lγ1 , γ0, γ1 > 0.
The fact that γ is increasing in L implies that nominal wages are more flexible as unemployment
increases but more rigid as employment increases. Furthermore, as we will show, the assumption
γ1 > 0 implies that there could exist a “secular stagnation” bubbleless steady state that features





where Πt−1,t ≡ PtPt−1 is the gross inflation rate between t− 1 and t.
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ZLB: As is standard in the literature, we assume that the entrepreneurs can trade nominal gov-
ernment bonds, which are in net zero supply and yield an interest rate 1 + it,t+1. The rate is set
according to a Taylor rule subject to a ZLB:






whereRft,t+1 is the real interest rate that would prevail with full employment in t+1 (i.e., Lt+1 = 1),
Π∗ > 0 is an inflation target, and ζ > 1 is a constant. The rule implies that if the ZLB does not
bind, then the inflation would be stabilized at the target Π∗.15
The definition of an equilibrium is similar to before, except that we have an additional endoge-









and the monetary policy rule (2.54) holds.
2.6.1 Bubbleless equilibrium and multiple steady states
In the bubbleless equilibrium, the cutoff threshold and capital stock are again given by (2.19)
and (2.21). The equilibrium wage, employment, and inflation satisfy
wt = max
{












15We do not model optimal monetary policy explicitly here. This is because in our model, an increase in the inflation
rate always weakly improves welfare by mitigating the wage rigidity. Thus, setting a very high inflation target to avoid
involuntary unemployment and the ZLB will be optimal. Realistically, there are costs of inflation, such as the costs
associated with nominal price rigidities, that are not modeled explicitly here. Also, in practice, central banks tend to
follow similar Taylor rules with inflation targets.
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For the rest of the paper, we assume:




where Rn is the bubbleless steady-state interest rate, as given by (2.25). Under this assumption,
because of the kink in the Taylor rule and the fact that the degree of wage rigidity is a function
of employment, there are two possible bubbleless steady states. In the “good” steady state (which
will continue to be denoted with a subscript n), there is full employment (Ln = 1), the ZLB is
slack, the inflation is at the target Π∗, the capital stock is given by Kn as in (2.23), and the real
interest rate is given by Rn as in (2.25). There is another “bad” steady state, where the ZLB binds
(i = 0) and inflation is below target, and there is involuntary unemployment (L < 1), leading to a
lower capital stock:
K = KnL < Kn.
The real interest rate is given by the indifference condition of the marginal investor:
R = ānαK
α−1L1−α = Rn.









which is smaller than the target Π∗ under assumption (2.55). The employment levelL is determined






Assumption (2.55) guarantees that there is involuntary unemployment in this steady state (L < 1),
and the ZLB does indeed bind (RΠζ(Π∗)1−ζ < 1).
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2.6.2 Bubbly equilibrium
We now analyze the bubbly economy. We focus on the relevant parameter range in which the
DNWR and the ZLB are slack as long as the bubble persists.16 Then as inflation is stabilized at the
target, the bubbly equilibrium dynamics are as characterized in Section 2.4, and the steady state is
as characterized in Section 2.4.1.
The post-bubble dynamics will however be different. Suppose the economy reaches the bubbly
steady state and then bubble collapses at period T (i.e., pbT+s = 0, ∀s ≥ 0). The collapse of the
bubble exerts downward pressure on the real interest rate through two channels. First, after the
bubble collapses, the productivity of the marginal investor decreases from āb to ān. Thus, instead of
the identityRT,T+1 = ābRkT+1 that would have prevailed if the bubble did not collapse in T , the real
interest is given by RT,T+1 = ānRkT+1, with ān < āb. Second, as the bubble has an expansionary
effect on capital accumulation, the post-bubble economy will follow the bubbleless dynamics as
specified in the previous section but with an initial capital stock Kb, which is larger than that in the
good steady stateKn. A high capital stock leads to a low marginal product of capital and thus a low
interest rate. The combination of these two mechanisms exerts a downward pressure on the real
interest rate and thus the nominal interest rate. If the bubble leads to sufficient large accumulation
of capital stock, its collapse can push the interest rate against the ZLB. Formally:
Proposition 10. [Effect of bubble’s collapse on R] Suppose the economy has reached the steady
state with an expansionary bubble and then the bubble collapses in a period denoted by T . If the
bubbly steady state Kb is sufficiently large such that
Kb > K̄ ≡ (ānAnΠ∗)
1
α(1−α) Kn,
then the Taylor rule (2.54) is constrained by the ZLB:
1 + iT,T+1 = 1 > R
f
T,T+1 (ΠT−1,T )
ζ (Π∗)1−ζ . (2.56)
16This is the case when the initial capital stock K0 and the initial bubble value pb0 are below the bubbly steady-state
levels, and Rb > 1/Π∗, where Rb is given by (2.39).
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Proof. Appendix B.1.3.
Remark. One could think of this as corresponding to a situation of “investment hangover,” or capi-
tal overinvestment, at the end of an economic boom (Rognlie et al. 2014). The difference between
our paper and Rognlie et al. (2014) is that the overinvestment is endogenous in our framework,
while it is imposed exogenously in theirs.
The next result shows that in the post-bubble economy, whenever the ZLB binds, the the
DNWR must also bind:
Lemma 11. [ZLB implies DNWR] For any t ≥ T + 1, if it−1,t = 0 then Lt < 1.
Proof. Appendix B.1.4.
We say that the economy is in a liquidity trap in period t if the ZLB binds (implying it−1,t =
0) and the DNWR binds (implying Lt < 1). We now show a stark result that, under certain
conditions, the post-bubble economy may never escape from the liquidity trap.17 Specifically, we
will construct a post-bubble equilibrium path where Lt < 1 and it−1,t = 0 for all t ≥ T + 1.













































17In reality, there can be shocks (not modeled here) that pull the economy out of the liquidity trap, such as a good
technology shock or another bubbly episode.
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2. On this equilibrium path, the economy experiences involuntary unemployment: LT+t < 1
for all t > 0, and the economy converges to the bad bubbleless steady state with involuntary
unemployment and below-target inflation described in Section 2.6.1.
Proof. Appendix B.1.5.
Figure 2.3 plots a simulated equilibrium path, in a manner similar to the simulation in Figure
2.1 (the dashed horizontal lines represent the good bubbleless steady state).18 As seen in the figure,
the collapse causes the real and nominal interest rate to fall sharply, and the nominal interest rate
hits the ZLB. The economy gradually converges to the bad bubbleless steady state. Intuitively,
when the monetary authority is constrained by the ZLB, inflation is below the target. Low inflation
exacerbates the DNWR, causing more unemployment. Higher unemployment in turn further re-
duces the marginal product of capital and the interest rates, creating a vicious cycle that perpetuates
the liquidity trap.
2.7 Conclusion
We have developed a tractable rational bubbles model with downward wage rigidity. We show
that expansionary bubbles could boost economic activities, but their collapse can push the economy
into a persistent slump with involuntary unemployment, and investment, output, and consumption
depressed below the pre-bubble levels. Under certain conditions, the economy is better off without
stochastic bubbles altogether. The model’s predictions are consistent with stylized features of
recent bubbly episodes. The model highlights the trade-off between the economic gains during the
boom due to the bubble and the loss from the bust. A macroprudential leaning-against-the-bubble
policy of taxing speculative investment can help balance this boom-bust trade-off.
The model has several limitations. For instance, the model predicts that, even though stochastic
bubbles can reduce welfare, a perfectly safe bubble is desirable, as it helps mitigate financial fric-
tions without any of the downside risk of an inefficient slump. Specifically, there is nothing in our
model to inherently prevent a bubble from sustaining forever. Thus, the model cannot address the
18Again the simulation is for a model with exogenous TFP growth rate g and partial capital depreciation rate δ.
Parameter values are γ0 = 0.98, γ1 = 0.015, Π∗ = 1.02, and ζ = 1.5 (following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2017),




















































Figure 2.3: Persistent post-bubble liquidity trap. Solid lines represent detrended equilibrium vari-
able values; gray dashed horizontal lines represent the corresponding good bubbleless steady-state
values.
concern of policymakers that some rapid increases in asset prices are unsustainable. Incorporating
elements from models with information friction may help address this issue (see Brunnermeier and
Oehmke 2013a or Barlevy 2018a for a survey). The model also features no equilibrium default and
hence cannot address the fact that corporate and household bankruptcy rates rose sharply after the
collapse of the Japanese or U.S. housing bubble. This drawback can potentially be addressed by
incorporating an agency problem (e.g., Allen, Barlevy, Gale, et al. 2017; Bengui and Phan 2016)
into our framework. We leave these as potential avenues for future research.
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CHAPTER 3
PARSING SPECULATIVE VALUE IN ASSET PRICES
3.1 Introduction
Prior to the U.S. housing bubble and global financial crisis in the 2000s, a common view main-
tained that central banks should not alter policy decisions in response to asset prices (Bernanke
and Gertler 2001). Even should a central bank be able to detect bubble episodes in financial sec-
tors, traditional inflation-targeting policy should respond only insofar as this exuberance informs
expectations of future inflation. However, the period following the Great Recession–as collapsing
housing and financial derivatives markets led to far-reaching, real economic consequences–served
as a reminder. Historically, the collapse of asset price bubbles tends to precede real economic
recessions (Jorda, Schularick, and Taylor 2015). The need to monitor financial sector cycles and
systemic risk renewed interest in developing empirical tools to monitor fragile, speculative over-
valuation – bubbles (Barlevy 2018b). Most notably, policymakers recognized an emphasis on the
intersection of credit cycles and asset price cycles; the so-called leveraged bubbles episodes.
However, the notion of a bubble component within an asset’s price is notoriously difficult to
pin down empirically. The observed price of an asset consists of three unobserved quantities: (1)
fundamental value, (2) bubble value, and (3) noise1. How might the econometrician parse each
of these three pieces in a convincing manner? Furthermore, suppose that policymakers are able
to observe the instantaneous bubbly value and are convinced that intervention is necessary. Is
there a particular macroprudential tool which central banks should implement to curb speculative
exuberance? Is traditional interest rate policy (leaning-against-the-wind) counterproductive as Gali
(2014b) and Gali and Gambetti (2015) predict? Is there an appropriate alternative?
1This may capture, for instance, model misspecification error or a structural element like the short term arbitrage
of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).
This paper develops a novel econometric framework based on state-of-the-art rational bubble
theory to identify and estimate the bubble component in dividend-producing asset prices (the S&P
500 index for proof of concept). The model is estimated in three sequential steps: (1) a struc-
tural factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) for aggregate states, (2) estimation of an
essentially affine term structure model, and (3) the use of a particle filter to estimate the bubble
component. In the first step, I augment Campbell and Shiller (1988) with four additional latent
aggregate factors identified in the cross-section of the FRED-MD data set. Structural macroeco-
nomic shocks are identified using the traditional Cholesky decomposition technique in the state
equation. The second step matches the U.S. government bond term structure in order to estimate
market returns and expected equity premia in a fashion similar to Ang and Piazzesi (2003). These
two steps allow me to estimate the equity fundamental value. The periods 1985-1990 and 2008
present encouraging results for the S&P 500 index.2 In these periods, with the exception of “Black
Monday” in 1987, economists and policymakers generally agree a bubble did not exist (or was
demonstrably small in magnitude). Likewise, my model predicts a fundamental value quite close
to the observed price in these periods. Furthermore, in the years preceding 2008, my model shows
the rapid growth in dividends and secular decline of real interest rates leading to a period of sus-
tained fundamental price growth. This combination also led to a strong recovery in fundamental
value following the Great Recession.
There are several key identifying assumptions in these two steps. First, I assume that dividend
growth for the priced equity follows a stationary autoregressive process. While this assumption
is quite common in workhorse asset pricing models, and may be valid for mature firms in mature
industries with a long history of dividend payments, there are a number of notable examples for
which the assumption fails (e.g., tech industry, structural breaks, young firms, index composition).
I also assume that there is a unique stochastic discount factor which prices U.S. government bonds
and equities. While portfolio diversification with safe assets offers a compelling argument in fa-
vor of this assumption, my model cannot speak to the issue of market segmentation. Finally, I
2Evidenced in Figure 3.5.
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assume there is no bubble value in U.S. government bonds. This is a theoretical necessity from the
perspective of rational bubbles, but does not allow for the existence of other bubble types such as
those which arise under heterogenous information.
In the final step, which represents the majority of my contributions to the literature, I use
Bayesian estimation in conjunction with a particle filter to estimate latent bubble value. The filter
matches a number of salient properties from the theoretical rational bubble literature which imply
nonlinear, non-Gaussian dynamics. Bubble growth contains sentiment shocks as in Miao, Wang,
and Xu (2015b), but they are assumed to have stochastic volatility and to be correlated with ag-
gregate macrofundamentals. This leads to what I have called a time-varying, bubbly excess return,
which is critical for matching observed price dynamics. The expected value of this excess return
represents the degree to which the market values speculative asset price risk given the present state
of the aggregate economy. It also captures a number of premia studied in the theoretical literature;
risk premia and liquidity premia being the most notable. The particle filter provides a cutting-edge
tool to efficiently estimate these dynamics where more traditional filtering methods fail.
I find that the estimated bubble component dominates the residual term in explaining the re-
maining price variance, and the critical model element which delivers this fit is a time-varying,
bubbly excess return. This suggests that a large portion of the net-fundamental price of the S&P
500 may be explained by a model of rational bubbles. I also document the insufficiency of rational
bubble models which suggest the bubble component must grow at a rate equal to the market rate of
interest. This class of models cannot hope to match observed price dynamics. Furthermore, I find
that this deviation of bubble growth from the market rate of interest is driven largely by period-by-
period sentiment shocks, rather than a forward looking expectation. This implies that current states
of the economy are poor predictors of the next period’s growth in the bubble component. However,
it also suggests that when sentiment and aggregate states are correlated, small shocks to aggregate
states (i.e., interest rate policy shocks) can lead to large adjustments in bubble magnitude. Small
policy; large effect.
I apply my framework to study several important policy-related questions in the context of
managing rational bubbles (Barlevy 2018b). In my model, policy surprises affect bubble growth
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through three channels: (1) the market rate of interest, (2) the expected bubbly excess return, and
(3) sentiment shocks correlated with aggregate macroeconomic shocks. I examine two prominent
macroeconomic tools in the literature: traditional contractionary interest rate policy and leverage
tightening. A key metric for the efficacy of these policies is the degree to which each is correlated
with bubble growth. I find that the correlation between bubble growth and the Effective Federal
Funds Rate is quite low (0.05), suggesting inefficacy of traditional interest rate policy. In con-
trast, I find the correlation between bubble growth and consumer leverage to be relatively large
(0.32). This provides encouraging evidence in favor of the collateral constraint story of rational
bubbles and the efficacy of leverage-tightening regulation. My results confirm the predictions of
Gali (2014b) and Gali and Gambetti (2015) that contractionary interest rate policy is counterpro-
ductive (it inflates the bubble). Additionally, I find that contractionary interest rate policy increases
consumer leverage on average, suggesting a secondary channel in which interest rates exacerbate
the bubble. However, I find that leverage tightening policy deflates asset price bubbles as intended.
Indeed, my model shows that small shocks to consumer leverage lead to large collapses in bub-
ble value of an asset, lending encouraging evidence to the notion of a Minsky moment (Minsky
1986) and the margin-call explanation for rapid asset price and real economic collapse (Jorda et al.
(2015)). Finally, interest rate policy’s secondary channel through leverage lends empirical support
for structural models featuring rational bubbles as collateral.
Related Literature This paper is mostly related to, and makes a number of contributions to,
the rational bubble literature. There are many theoretical explanations for why rational bubbles
exist and how they interact with the real economy, for which Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013b)
offer a summary. Each explanation requires a certain set of model characteristics (Santos and
Woodford 1997). This paper draws predominantly on the class of models exhibiting heterogenous
agents, short sale constraints, collateral constraints, and uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks such as
Kocherlakota (1992a), Kocherlakota (2008), Hirano, Inaba, and Yanagawa (2015b), Hirano and
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Yanagawa (2017), Hanson and Phan (2017b), and Biswas, Hanson, and Phan (ming).3 I also uti-
lize the idea of stochastic growth and partial collapse in the context of rational bubbles such as is
found in Kamihigashi (2011), Martin and Ventura (2012b), Gali (2014b), Miao et al. (2015b), and
Guerron-Quintana, Hirano, and Jinnai (2019). The finance literature has developed a class of mod-
els which satisfy these necessary conditions and synthesize the dynamics into Markovian equilibria
(Chien, Cole, and Lustig 2011).4 Furthermore, the structural equilibrium may be estimated using
techniques found in the essentially affine term structure class of empirical finance models (Duffee
2002). Because assets of finite maturity cannot support rational bubbles (Santos and Woodford
1997), the term structure of U.S. government bonds offers an attractive method to estimate market
returns and the expected equity risk premium. The resulting empirical strategy utilizes Ang and
Piazzesi (2003) to estimate the fundamental value of the S&P 500 while preserving model quali-
ties needed to support rational bubbles. To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to combine the
essentially affine term structure and rational bubble literatures.
The second contribution concerns the empirical estimation of bubble magnitude. There is a
long literature concerned with estimating the extensive margin of asset price bubbles ex post.5
Early work by, inter alia, Blanchard and Watson (1982b), Diba and Grossman (1988b), and Flood
and Hodrick (1990), used the test for unit roots in sufficiently differenced asset prices to detect
periods in which asset prices were more explosive than dividends. My work is related to the
critique of this literature, pioneered by Evans (1991) and Fukuta (1998) which is concerned with
the multiplicity of bubble episodes and the potential for partial collapse. While the unit root testing
literature developed approaches to mitigate this concern (Homm and Breitung 2012; Phillips et al.
2015), another branch formed which viewed bubble episodes in a regime-switching framework
(Al-Anaswah and Wilfling 2011; Shi and Song 2016; Fulop and Yu 2017). The results from Shi
3There is a similar class of models exhibiting firm heterogeneity instead (Miao and Wang 2012b; Miao, Wang, and
Zhou 2015b; Miao and Wang 2018b).
4Other financial models of this kind are Constantinides and Duffie (1996), Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2009), and
Gottardi and Kubler (2015). These models do not specifically address rational bubbles, but do satisfy the necessary
conditions to support such equilibria.
5See Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013b) for an overview.
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and Song (2016) suggest, within the context of an infinite hidden Markov framework, bubbly
episodes exhibit more distinct regimes than the literature has been willing to entertain. I continue
this concept in allowing for the bubble state space to be continuous.
However, the extensive margin represents one concern of many. Recent theoretical advances
in the rational bubble literature suggest that the magnitude of the bubble (intensive margin) is im-
portant when considering macroprudential intervention (Biswas, Hanson, and Phan ming).6 Miao
et al. (2015b) offer perhaps the first structural environment which would allow for magnitude es-
timation by treating the bubble as an estimable, latent sentiment shock embedded in a Bayesian
DSGE framework. They find that this latent sentiment shock is key for matching price dynamics.
In a similar vein, I model the bubble growth process as latent and stochastic, interpret innovations
to this process as “sentiment shocks”, and estimate its magnitude using Bayesian methods. Fur-
thermore, I also find the notion of a sentiment shock to be important for matching price dynamics.
Figure 3.8 represents a corollary to the variance decomposition performed in Miao et al. (2015b).
However, unlike them, I assume that these sentiment shocks are correlated with fundamental, ag-
gregate, macroeconomic shocks. In traditional rational bubble models, macroprudential policies
which affect the aggregate states (e.g., interest rate policy) only affect the bubble insofar as they
alter the risk-free rate of the market and the expected equity premium. This correlation which
I implement allows for expected co-movement between the stochastic discount factor and bubble
growth and results in the notion of an expected bubbly excess return. Macroprudential policy could
thus affect the bubble through this channel as well.
Guerron-Quintana et al. (2019) extend the notion of the bubble in a regime-switching context
to a DSGE model which is partially calibrated, partially estimated. They find that bubbles can
be detrimental to long run growth in the presence of a well-developed financial sector, but bene-
ficial in the case of under-developed financial sectors. This underpins the point made in Hirano
and Yanagawa (2017) that bubbles’ effect on real economic growth is non-monotonic in the size
of the bubble and in the degree of financial development, suggesting that accounting for bubble
6See also Martin and Ventura (2012b), Farhi and Tirole (2012), Hirano et al. (2015b), Hirano and Yanagawa (2017),
and Miao and Wang (2018b).
55
magnitude when evaluating macroprudential regulation is key.
Finally, I apply the model to the ongoing debate about the effectiveness of monetary and macro-
prudential policies in regulating bubbles. In particular, I analyze the impact of a leverage-tightening
shock and contractionary interest rate shock on bubble magnitude and growth.7 I am not the first
to examine the latter shock’s effect on asset price bubbles. Using a time-varying, structural vector
autoregression framework, Gali and Gambetti (2015)8 consider the impact of conventional, con-
tractionary interest rate policy on the estimated difference between observed price and fundamental
price. They find that such a policy has the opposite effect to that predicted by “lean-against-the-
wind” proponents: it exacerbates bubble episodes. My results corroborate this finding and include
a discussion of an additional channel through which interest rate policy inflates the bubble: con-
tractionary policy shocks loosen leverage restrictions on average. Leverage tightening policy is
not a new concept, as Dodd-Frank and Basel III represent two notable examples limiting margin
investing, but its analysis in the context of rational bubbles is nascent.9
An important concept in Kocherlakota (2008) is that bubbles can arise or collapse due to fi-
nancial shocks,10 and that collateral constraints will (occasionally) bind in the same periods from
the perspective of the econometrician. Typical examinations of credit-based macroprudential reg-
ulation occur in the context of permanently-binding collateral constraints (Miao and Wang 2015b;
Miao et al. 2015b). This paper allows for an environment with occasionally binding collateral
constraints using the flexible specification of the stochastic discount factor found in the essentially
affine term structure literature. To the best of my knowledge, this paper and Biljanovska et al.
(2019b) are the first to consider macroprudential policy in an environment allowing for rational
bubbles and occasionally binding collateral constraints.
The rest of the paper will proceed as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model framework in
7The model environment lends itself neatly to the analysis of any combination of structural shocks identified in the
first estimation step. Further research could easily extend to analyze other types of shocks.
8The empirical counterpart to Gali (2014b).
9See Biljanovska, Gornicka, and Vardoulakis (2019b) for example.
10Typically thought of as shocks to a collateral constraint, exogenous or endogenous.
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three pieces along with a discussion of the data and empirical strategies necessary to estimate each
step. Section 3.3 presents the results of the model in estimating the bubble component. Section 3.4
presents a discussion of counterfactuals and macroprudential policy implications. Finally, Section
3.5 concludes.
3.2 Model
In the canonical rational expectations asset pricing framework, the observed price of an eq-
uity can be broadly decomposed into three pieces: fundamental value, persistent deviation from
fundamental (“bubble”), and noise. All three of these components are unobserved to the econome-
trician, so some manner of theory must be used to parse the observed price. First, the fundamental
value of an asset can be calculated as the expected sum of discounted future dividends. This result
sets marginal cost (price of investing in the asset) equal to marginal revenue (discounted dividends
paid ad infinitum per asset unit). Second, the bubble value must meet certain theoretical require-
ments which pin down its growth dynamics. Finally, short-term arbitrage opportunities must be
temporary and have zero mean in the context of rational expectations.
3.2.1 Asset Pricing Framework
In this section I decompose the observed asset price into the first two of three components: fun-




t [exp {−rt} (Vt+1 +Dt+1)]
where Vt is the ex-dividend price, Dt is the dividend paid, rt is the log risk free rate of the market,
and EQt represents expectation taken with respect to the risk-neutral measure treating information
up to time t as known. Under the assumptions of complete markets and no-arbitrage, the risk-
neutral measure is unique. By denoting the Radon-Nikodym derivative as ξt, the pricing equation
can be written in terms of the observed physical measure:
Vt = Et [exp {mt,t+1} (Vt+1 +Dt+1)] (3.1)
where mt,t+1 = ln
ξt+1
ξt
− rt is the stochastic discount factor. This equation states that the price
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paid for a dividend-producing asset must be equal to the expected discounted future revenue from
holding the asset. The discounting is stochastic, because it depends on the state of the world in
time t+ 1, which is unknown in time t.


























The first term in equation (3.2) is the fundamental value of the asset, and it is equal to the
expectation of all future discounted dividend streams to be paid by the asset. The second term is
the limiting scrap value of the asset and equals zero when the asset is priced at its fundamental
price. If the second term is positive, the asset is priced away from its fundamental, and I refer to
this case as a bubble. The magnitude of the bubble is equal to this limiting scrap value in each time





Letting V ft denote the fundamental value and Bt denote the bubble value, I refer to the asset
pricing equation as Vt = V
f
t +Bt.
Because of its relationship to the limiting value of the asset’s price, the bubble must grow
according to a risk-adjusted martingale:
Bt = Et [exp {mt,t+1}Bt+1] (3.3)
which implies the first three necessary components for a statistical model of bubbles: (1)Bt ≥ 0 ∀t,
11Often, tranversality conditions necessary for solving individual agent optimization problems are cited as reasons
why bubbles cannot exist from a theoretical perspective. For an infinitely-lived representative agent under perfect





Bt = 0 ∀t. There are a number of environments in which bubbles can still exist (Santos and Woodford 1997).
One direction of modern work in the rational bubble literature assumes models of the class considered in Kocher-
lakota (1992a) where heterogenous agents and credit/collateral constraints support the existence of rational bub-
bles, because individual stochastic discount factors are not necessarily equal to the market stochastic discount













at the market stochastic discount factor need not equal zero.
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(2) if Bt = 0 then Bt+j = 0 ∀j > 0, and (3) bubbles must grow in expectation at the market rate
of discounting (Diba and Grossman 1988a). The proof is in Appendix C.1.1. Equation (3.3) is a
condition which underpins the vast majority of rational bubble models and is derived directly from
the asset pricing Euler equation. Thus the two key components for pinning down the dynamics of
bubble growth are the stochastic discount factor process and its covariance with bubble growth.
For instance, with the assumption of a constant required rate of return exp {−mt,t+1} = R > 1
and a stationary dividends process, equation (3.3) implies that the bubble component of an asset’s
price should come to dominate the the fundamental in finite time; an argument which was fre-
quently used to rule out bubbles empirically. One approach to challenging this view was pioneered
by Evans (1991) and Fukuta (1998), which formulated models of bubbles that grew at a constant
market rate of return in expectation, but featured multiple regimes: explosive growth and partial
collapse. This Markov-switching environment was subsequently heavily used in the empirical
literature.12
However, the imposition of a finite number of regimes places an unnecessary, artificial limi-
tation on the dynamics of the bubble component which can be relaxed. This paper proposes an
alternative specification for the bubble growth process which does not rely on a regime-switching
environment. By allowing for risk-averse agents and a theoretically-justified correlation between
bubble growth and the aggregate states of the economy, this paper delivers a continuous process
which exhibits stochastic growth and partial collapse in a flexible framework. The formulation for
this process will be derived in Section 3.2.5.
Equation (3.2) decomposes the observed price of a productive asset (equity, housing, etc.) as
a linear sum of the fundamental price and the bubble price. From equation (3.3), the dynamics of
the bubble process resemble those of a separate, infinite-maturity, zero-coupon bond which gives
inter-temporal return Bt+1/Bt. Thus we may consider the observed price of an asset to operate as
a portfolio of two infinitely-lived assets: a productive, dividend-producing asset and a zero-coupon
12e.g. Hall, Psaradakis, and Sola (1999), Al-Anaswah and Wilfling (2011), and Shi and Song (2016)
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bond.13 The return to holding the fundamental portion of this portfolio is determined entirely by
aggregate state dynamics. The return to holding the bubble portion of the portfolio is correlated
with the returns to holding the fundamental portion of the portfolio only insofar as bubble growth
is correlated with the aggregate state dynamics. As shown in Section 3.2.5, this correlation is key
to matching observed price dynamics.
Estimation of the observed price of an asset depends on three elements: (1) a model of dividend
growth, (2) a model of the stochastic discount factor, and (3) a model of the bubble which follows
the dynamics given in equation (3.3). The following three subsections will address these elements
in turn.
3.2.2 Model of Dividend Growth
A well-known consequence of Shiller (1981) is that the best model of dividends possible from
an implied price-variation perspective is an AR(1) process. In the context of the Efficient Market
Hypothesis, this dividend process has the best hope of matching observed variation in equity prices.
Thus, an AR(1) process for dividends is frequently assumed empirically (e.g., Al-Anaswah and
Wilfling 2011). I augment the vector autoregression (VAR) model in Campbell and Shiller (1988)
with additional latent aggregate states using the FRED-MD database14 in a factor-augmented VAR
(FAVAR) model. These additional aggregate states are used to improve the estimation of the
stochastic discount factor in the subsequent section. The models of Shiller (1981) and Campbell
and Shiller (1988) are nested within my specification.
Denoting log dividend growth as ∆dt+1 = ln
Dt+1
Dt
, the fundamental price-dividend ratio of an














In a similar vein to Campbell and Shiller (1988), assume that the log dividend growth rate
13The notion of a “portfolio” is incomplete in this sense, given agents cannot re-balance the relative shares in the
portfolio. However, this language facilitates a discussion of the bubbly excess return in Section 3.2.5.
14McCracken and Ng (2015)
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follows a vector autoregressive (VAR) process jointly with a measure of aggregate log inflation πt
and the nominal, log market return rnt . Let Zt ≡ [∆dt, rnt , πt]
′:
Zt = ΓZZt−1 + u
Z
t
uZt ∼ N (0,ΩZ)
This three-factor model represents a simple formulation for aggregate states of the economy
which would be used to price assets according to the stochastic discount factor process and to form
expectations about future dividend streams. However, with an eye toward improving the model
of the stochastic discount factor, suppose that there are a number of other aggregate states of the
economy which are used to price assets in the market. Examples include the Fama-French factors,
industrial productivity, or a measure of investor leverage.
The FRED-MD data set from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis contains 128 such macroe-
conomic observables available at a monthly frequency, 114 of which are available in the window
January 1985 - August 2018. In addition to these, Fama and French (1993) identify three stock
market specific variables. Altogether, these represent 117 observable macroeconomic indicators
useful for pricing equities. Denote the vector of time-t observations of these as Yt. Finally, the
S&P 500 index real price and real dividend series were drawn from Robert Shiller. Further details
are available in appendix C.3.
Along with the three factors previously presented, a total of 120 observable aggregate states
of the economy could be used to price assets. Instead of estimating a VAR using all of these
observables (a case facing severe issues of dimensionality), suppose there exist a subset k latent
factors which linearly capture a sufficient amount of the variation in the observables. To be precise,
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Figure 3.1: Determining the number of factors according to Bai and Ng (2002). Local minimum
is denoted by vertical dashed lines. The top row depicts marginal (scree plot) and cumulative
percentage of variation in Yt explained by adding the kth latent factor. The bottom row depicts
two information criteria proposed by Bai and Ng (2002) for selecting the appropriate number of
factors.
suppose there exists a k-dimensional vector of latent objects Xt, of which Yt are a linear function:
Yt = ΛxXt + ΛzZt + ηt









. This representation is the factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR)
of Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005).
The goal of this estimation is twofold: (1) to estimate a statistical model of the dividends
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process used in forming future expectations and (2) estimating the time series {Xt} as a reduced-
dimension proxy for the aggregate states of the economy. Under a fairly general set of assumptions,
estimated standard errors of the generated regressors {Xt} may be ignored for latter-stage regres-
sions; thus treating {Xt} as if they represented observed aggregate states (Bai and Ng 2006). In
practice, this means that the estimation procedure for this section of the model may be run inde-
pendently of subsequent model estimation. Figure 3.1 shows the results from implementing the
strategy in Bai and Ng (2002), which proposes information criteria IC1 and IC2 for determining
the number of latent factors to employ. Minima of these criteria occur at k = 4, which jointly ex-
plain a third of the total variation in {Yt}. Therefore, let K = 7 be the dimension of the aggregate
state vector St: k = 4 latent aggregate states and three observed aggregate states [∆dt, rnt , πt]
′.
Identification of parameters and the latent factors stems from a set of normalizations. I follow
the normalization “IRb” considered in Bai et al. (2016), which proceeds as follows. Let the inno-
vations to the aggregate states νt be composed of innovations to the latent factors ut ∈ Rk and in-
novations to the observed factors vt ∈ R3, such that νt ≡
 ut
vt
. Normalize Ωu ≡ E [utu′t] = Ik,
the k-dimensional identity matrix. Normalize Ωuv ≡ E [u′tvt] = 0, which implies that innovations
to observed and latent factors are uncorrelated.15 Finally, normalize the k × k upper submatrix of
Λx to be lower triangular.
This final normalization breaks the rotational-equivalence issue of latent factor models in a
specific way reminiscent of recursive identification of structural shocks in the structural VAR lit-
erature. It imposes that the first listed variable in Yt is affected contemporaneously only by the
first factor in Xt, the second listed variable in Yt is affected contemporaneously only by the first
two factors in Xt, and so on. In this normalization framework, a careful selection of the ordering
in Yt can preserve economic interpretation of the latent factors. I order the vector Yt such that
the first four listed variables are (in order): (1) industrial production index, (2) Effective Federal
Funds Rate, (3) non-revolving consumer credit to personal income ratio, and (4) trade-weighted
15For a discussion regarding why this normalization is appropriate, see Bai et al. (2016).
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U.S. dollar index to major currencies. This ordering is reminiscent of the “slow-R-fast” methodol-
ogy originally proposed by Bernanke et al. (2005). Thus we may consider the first latent factor in
Xt to be a measure of total factor productivity. The second latent factor is the common variation
of the Effective Federal Funds Rate which is net TFP effects, and I consider to be an interest rate
policy factor.16 The third is an important addition to the suite of VAR considerations and repre-
sents a consumer leverage factor net the effects of industrial productivity and interest rate policies.
Cycles in this factor will represent the element of credit cycles orthogonal to traditional business
cycles (proxied by TFP) and interest rate policy cycles. I consider the consequences of leverage-
tightening macroprudential policy in the context of this factor. Finally, the fourth factor represents
the relative strength of the dollar net the effects of real economic productivity, interest rate policy,
and credit availability.
I estimate the dynamics in equation (3.5) according to the quasi-maximum likelihood approach
described in Bai et al. (2016). First stage latent factors and parameters are estimated from a trans-
formed matrix of observables Ỹ = IT − Z (Z ′Z)−1 Z using QMLE and are then rotated into a
chosen normalization scheme (IRb). This approach offers more efficient estimates of Xt than a
traditional principal components estimation (Bai and Li 2016) and does not require the iterative
procedure found in the PC-OLS literature. Table C.2 shows point estimates of select model param-
eters and figure 3.2 shows the extracted latent factors.
The results of Gali and Gambetti (2015) could be obfuscated by a second channel of interest
rate policy’s influence on a bubble. They argue that the direct impact of contractionary interest rate
policy on the magnitude of a bubble is a positive one. However, they do not consider how raising
interest rates makes leveraged assets with bubbles more collateralizable. This increases leverage
by permitting further speculative investment. Raising interest rates could also reduce leverage by
raising the cost of borrowing (i.e. “leaning-against-the-wind”), which implies that the net effect
16Recursive identification of monetary policy is often seen as an inferior identification technique to narrative ap-
proaches. For the purposes of this model, its simplicity is an attractive quality. However, the estimated factor for in-
terest rate policy is moderately, positively correlated with the Romer and Romer (2004) (0.16) and Gertler and Karadi
(2015) (0.29) shocks. Local projections of the estimated interest rate factor onto the GK shock, controlling for three
lags of all aggregate states and Newey-West errors of order three, fail to reject the null hypothesis of contemporaneous
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Figure 3.2: Estimated aggregate states from an FAVAR in equation (3.5). The top row lists the four
latent factors, and the bottom row lists the three observed factors. Estimation proceeds using the
IRb normalization strategy in Bai et al. (2016) and aggregate macroeconomic observables from the
FRED-MD database, January 1985-August 2018. Latent factors are named according to ordering
of observed variables in the vector Yt and a lower-triangular normalization on Λx.
of interest rate policy movements on leverage is unclear. Figure 3.3 shows the net response of
the leverage factor to an unexpected, temporary, positive, one standard deviation shock to the
interest rate policy factor. On average, leverage is persistently higher following a contractionary
interest rate policy shock, which suggests the collateralizability channel dominates the increased
cost of borrowing channel. In particular, the effect is statistically significant at the three-to-five
year horizon. As noted by Kindleberger and Aliber (2015) and Jorda et al. (2015), leverage booms
tend to be positively correlated with asset price booms, suggesting that this second channel of
interest rate policy may further exacerbate the speculative episode. This is verified in Section 3.4.
Finally, with an eye toward future structural analysis of shocks, note that Ων is nearly lower
triangular. By assumption, the covariance matrix of the latent factors Ωu is the identity matrix
and the covariance between observed and latent factors Ωuv is zero. Identification of structural
shocks in the context of the aggregate state VAR equation thus depends on normalizations on the
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Figure 3.3: Response of the leverage factor to an unexpected, temporary, positive, one standard
deviation shock to the interest rate policy factor. 90% confidence bands shaded.
covariance of the observed factors Ωv. Suppose the ordering of the three observed factors in Zt is
(1) dividends, (2) nominal risk-free rate, and (3) inflation. Then a Cholesky decomposition of Ωv
leads to a recursive identification of the Bernanke et al. (2005) “slow-R-fast” variety. Let Σs be the
Cholesky decomposition of Ων such that the aggregate state equation may be written:






3.2.3 Model of the Stochastic Discount Factor
With a model for dividend growth and aggregate states of the economy in hand, what remains
for pricing the fundamental value of an equity is a model of the stochastic discount factor: how
investors discount future dividends. In this section I present a model for the stochastic discount
factor that matches a number of salient equilibrium qualities from the rational bubble literature.
I estimate the stochastic discount factor process using the U.S. government bond term structure.
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In particular, I follow the framework of Duffee (2002) and Ang and Piazzesi (2003)17 for the
following.
Suppose the one-period, real short rate offered in the market is the expected real risk-free rate:
rt = lnEt [exp {rnt − πt+1}]
= e′rSt + lnEt [exp {−e′πSt+1}]
= (e′r − e′πΓs)St + lnEt [exp {−e′πΣsεt+1}]






where the final equality proceeds using the log-normality of exp {−e′πΣsεt+1}, er is the K × 1
column vector of zeros with a one in the index corresponding to rnt ’s index in St, and eπ is a
similar column vector corresponding to πt. In the context of the essentially affine term structure
model, Ang and Piazzesi (2003) show that the price of a zero-coupon bond with n periods until
maturity is
P nt = exp
{





















− e′r + A′n (ΓS − Σsλ1)
The system of difference equations is initialized by setting a0 = 0 and A′0 = [0, 0, . . . , 0]. λ0 and
λ1 are parameters governing the stochastic discount factor process.
I use the U.S. government bond term structure to estimate the stochastic discount factor pro-
cess, because government bonds match a number of convenient features. First, because assets of
finite maturity cannot support rational bubbles18, there is no need to model a bubbly component
17There is a subtle, yet important distinction between my approach and Ang and Piazzesi (2003). I do not include an
estimation of latent yield curve factors which are orthogonal to macrofundamentals. In my specification, the stochastic
discount factor is priced entirely by macrofundamentals estimated in Section 3.2.2.
18The argument proceeds by induction. The return from the bubble portion of an asset Bt+1/Bt is contingent on
being able to sell the asset in the next period. For the period of maturity T , the owner of the asset cannot expect to sell
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in the pricing of U.S. government bonds (Santos and Woodford 1997). Second, U.S. government
bonds operate in a zero-coupon fashion, and thus there are no dividend processes to estimate.19
In summary, U.S. government bonds may be priced by the stochastic discount factor only. There-
fore, if the statistical model for the stochastic discount factor matches the dynamics of the U.S.
government bond term structure well, then the process is well-estimated in-sample.
In order to estimate the stochastic discount factor process, I obtain U.S. government bond sec-
ondary market yields on a monthly frequency from January 1985 - August 2018 from the FRED-
MD database. Available maturities were 3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 5-year, and 10-year. I impose
the same block-diagonal restrictions on λ1 as in Ang and Piazzesi (2003). Furthermore, in order
to ensure convergence of the bond pricing system of difference equations, λ1 is restricted such that
the eigenvalues of ΓS − Σsλ1 are all less than unity in absolute value. Estimation proceeds using
maximum likelihood assuming the price of a zero-coupon bond of maturity length n follows a
normal distribution with time-dependent mean given by the dynamics in equation (3.8). Normally
distributed measurement errors are assumed independent across time and maturity length.
Figure 3.4 shows the implied yield-to-maturity of zero-coupon government bonds. The solid
blue line represents the observed yield-to-maturity for each maturity length, whereas the orange
dashed line depicts the model-implied yield. The fit is strong for the lower end of the yield curve,
which is to be expected given the nominal risk-free rate (instrumented by the one-month T-bill
rate) is included as a regressor. The weakening of fit with longer-maturity yields was previously
documented by Ang and Piazzesi (2003) when excluding orthogonal term-structure specific fac-
tors. The fit could be improved at the cost of the stochastic discount factor’s clean definition as a
function of macrofundamental states.
the asset in the following period T + 1. Thus BT+1 = 0 and there is no return to supporting bubbly value in the asset
in period T , and thus no agents would purchase such an asset priced above fundamental in period T . With no demand
for the bubble value in period T , the return to purchasing the asset in period T − 1 would also be zero. By induction,
Bt = 0 for all periods in the life of the finite-maturity asset. This does not account for the possibility of other forms
of bubbles in US government bonds such as those generated by heterogenous beliefs. I assume these elements are not
present in the price of government bonds at any time in the sample.















































































































































































Figure 3.4: Implied term structure of U.S. government bonds at maturity lengths 3M, 6M, 1Y, 5Y,
and 10Y. Units represent the yield-to-maturity of a zero-coupon bond. The blue, solid line depicts
the observed yield for each maturity length. The orange, dashed line depicts the yield implied by
a maximum likelihood estimation procedure to estimate λ0 and λ1 using the pricing structure in
equation (3.8). Measurement errors were assumed independent across time and across maturity
length.
Remark. Rational bubbles are supported only by a small subset of economic models and require
particular features to be present (Santos and Woodford 1997). In particular, recent literature em-
ploys models with infinitely-lived, heterogenous agents facing uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, col-
lateral constraints, and short sale constraints.20 An appropriate statistical model for the market
stochastic discount factor should account for the aggregated effects of these model elements from
individual optimality conditions and should ideally represent a Markovian equilibrium. It is in-
deed possible to construct a Markovian equilibrium in aggregate states and the stochastic discount
20See, for instance, Kocherlakota (1992a, 2008, 2009b), Hirano et al. (2015b), Hirano and Yanagawa (2017), and
Biswas et al. (ming)
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factor for such a class of models. Chien et al. (2011)21 provide an environment with infinitely-
lived, heterogenous agents facing uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, collateral constraints, and short
sale constraints; and they show that this class of models can be described by a Markovian equilib-
rium in aggregate states and a stochastic discount factor process which depends on higher-order,
exponential-affine functions of aggregate states.
3.2.4 Fundamental Price
With a model for aggregate state dynamics, dividend growth, and the stochastic discount fac-
tor22 in hand, the fundamental value of an asset (in this case the S&P500 index) can be calculated
for each time t. In particular the fundamental price-dividend ratio of an asset can be written as an








cn + (Cn − e∆d)′ St
}
(3.9)
where, similarly to the case of pricing bonds, the terms cn and Cn satisfy a system of difference
equations:










SCn−1 − C ′n−1Σsλ0
Cn = e
′
πΓs − e′r + e′∆d + C ′n−1 (ΓS − Σsλ1)
As before, the system is initialized at c0 = 0 and C ′0 = [0, 0, . . . , 0], and e∆d is the K × 1 column
vector of zeros with a one in the index corresponding to ∆dt’s index in St. The proof is in appendix
C.1.2.
21See also, e.g., Constantinides and Duffie (1996) and Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2009)
22The reader may wonder whether a stochastic discount factor process derived from government bonds is an appro-
priate analog for the market stochastic discount factor, and whether it is appropriate to use the same to price equities.
If the majority of investors who invest in the U.S. government bond market also invest in equities considered in the
empirical framework (S&P 500 index), then no-arbitrage would imply the discounting process is the same for both
assets. From a diversification perspective, this situation is highly likely. U.S. government bonds are widely regarded
as among the safest assets available in financial markets, and are thus used to hedge against other risky elements of a
portfolio. This assumption fails, however, if market segmentation implies those who invest in government bonds do














































































S&P 500 Price-Dividend Ratio
Figure 3.5: Model-implied S&P 500 index real price and real price-dividend ratio. The orange
dashed line in the right panel represents the model-implied price divided by the observed dividend.
The model-implied price was calculated using results from sections (3.2.2) and (3.2.3) and equation
(3.9). The summation in equation (3.9) was truncated at 1000 terms.
Figure 3.5 shows the model-implied fundamental price and fundamental price-dividend ratio
(dashed orange line) for the S&P 500 index from January 1985 - August 2018.23 These results are
plotted alongside the observed real price and real price-dividend ratios (solid blue line). No esti-
mation routine thus far was performed to explicitly match either of these dynamics; the estimates
are contingent only on the results from sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. Because equation (3.9) represents
an infinite sum, I truncate the sum at 1000 terms. The marginal summand reaches an order of
magnitude 10−13 at the 1000th term and is monotonically decreasing toward 0, so the effects of
this artificial truncation are negligible.
There are two specific windows to note to gauge how well the model fits the observed price
data. First, Phillips et al. (2015) do not identify any bubbly episodes in the period 1985-1995 with
23The notion of a fundamental equity premium is a key tool for the pricing of any asset. Although not explicitly
shown in-text, the interested reader may consult Appendix C.1.3 for a discussion of the model-implied fundamental
equity premium and its relation to bubble presence and growth.
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the exception of “Black Monday”, the period they denote from June 1986 - September 1987. This
period corresponds to the jagged peak observed in the 1980s in figure 3.5. Under the assumption
of no bubble (or negligible bubble) during the period 1985-1995, the observed price should be
equal to the fundamental price of the asset which is modeled by equation (3.9). For the period
1985-1991, the dashed line (model) in the left panel of figure 3.5 matches the solid line (observed)
very well. Secondly, in the wake of the global financial crisis most experts would agree that the
“bubble had burst”, if it existed to begin with. The sharp decline in the observed price corresponds
to November 2008 - January 2009, a window in the which the model-implied fundamental value
also matches the observed price quite well.
However, even with a well-specified aggregate state space, dividend process, and stochastic
discount factor process, Shiller’s argument against the usefulness of the Efficient Market Hypoth-
esis in matching observed price-dividend ratios still holds (Shiller 1981). There is a component of
the observed price still missing.
3.2.5 Model of the Bubble
Equation (3.2) would suggest that what is missing from the model of equity pricing is a limiting
term, which I have called a bubble. In this section I show that the bubble growth rate is a function
of both the real risk free rate and a “bubbly excess return” term. If innovations to the bubble
growth process are correlated with innovations to the aggregate states, this bubbly excess return
is dependent on the lagged aggregate state of the economy. I provide theoretical justification for
this correlation as well as stochastic volatility and discuss the Bayesian filtering method I use to
estimate the bubble component. The model of bubble growth and estimation therein are my main
contributions.
The reader may wonder why the bubble cannot be modeled simply as the observed price of the
asset net estimated fundamental value. This is due to the third component of an asset’s observed
price: noise or short-term arbitrage opportunities. The bubble represents the long-term, strictly
positive deviation from fundamental priced by the market. However, there may be opportunity for
short-term arbitrage in a model with rational agents. In the context of costly state verification and
asymmetric access to information, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) show that the observed price of a
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dividend-producing asset will be distributed normally with a mean equal to the fundamental value
of the asset. This implies that in any given period the observed price may be temporarily above or
below the fundamental price. Because this distributional nature of the observed price arises from
costly state verification of the asset’s return, I assume in the context of my model that agents are
unsure of the return of the aggregate “portfolio” V ft +Bt. Thus, I augment equation (3.2) to assume
the observed price is normally distributed with a mean equal to V ft +Bt:
Vt = V
f








The results from Section 3.2.4 suggest that the fundamental price is known. What remains for
estimating the bubble componentBt is a filtering problem on the quantity V ∗t = Vt−V
f
t , where the
bubble may be thought of as the signal and uet as the noise to be filtered out.
24 However, equation
(3.3) shows that the Markov transition kernel for the bubble component must follow a risk-adjusted































exp {mt,t+1} , Bt+1Bt
)
Et [exp {mt,t+1}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
excess return
(3.11)
Early empirical work to identify bubbly episodes was predicated on the notion that a bubble,
24The assumption of an additive and iid noise is a convenient, yet stringent one. For instance, secularly growing
(declining) deviations of price from estimated fundamental can only be captured by growth in the bubble component.
In the case of dividend growth misspecification, expectations of future dividends are over- (under-) estimated, and thus
the fundamental price would be persistently under- (over-) estimated. These trends could not be captured by uet given
the additive and iid assumptions.
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if it exists, must grow in expectation at the (potentially time-varying) market rate of interest.25
This amounts to setting Covt
(
exp {mt,t+1} , Bt+1Bt
)
= 0 ∀t. Stochastic bubbles, such as those
considered by Blanchard and Watson (1982b) would imply a risk adjustment term to the bubble
growth rate which amounts to setting the excess return equal to a non-zero constant. However, there
is recent theoretical evidence which suggests there are time-varying elements of risk associated
with holding a bubbly asset which are not fully priced by the market.
Consider the observation of Jorda et al. (2015) that bubble growth is often correlated with
leverage growth, and that bubble bursting episodes often coincide with rapid deleveraging episodes.
This forms an empirical foundation for the class of models which support rational bubbles through
the use of collateral constraints. Biljanovska et al. (2019b) provide a theoretical environment
of occasionally binding collateral constraints which give rise to bubbles and very neatly show
the relationship between bubble growth and the stochastic discount factor through these binding
constraints. Additionally, consider the environment of Miao and Wang (2018b) in which bubbles
in firm value act as a form of liquidity premium and grow at a rate which is proportional to the
value of the firm (in addition to the market rate of interest). Finally, consider a stochastic bubble
with a state-dependent probability of bursting or rapid expansion. Such a bubble would command
a time-varying and state-dependent risk premium.
The explicit link between bubble growth and aggregate state movements is perhaps best illus-
trated by the financial instability hypothesis of Hyman Minsky (Minsky 1986, 1992). In short,
his hypothesis posited that the financial sector exhibits cycles of endogenous instability which are
linked to aggregate business cycles. As the aggregate economy is prosperous, corporate cash flow
exceeds debt service payments and bubbles can emerge. Eventually, debt service exceeds incom-
ing revenue and produces a financial crisis marked by margin-calls and tightened credit markets.
Minsky in particular highlights two important moments in the cycle: a displacement event which
accelerates the bubble, and the “Minsky moment” in which some contractionary aggregate event
25e.g. Blanchard and Watson (1982b); Diba and Grossman (1988b); Evans (1991)
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highlights the insolvency of the asset price and precipitates the crash. Minsky cites rapid tech-
nological growth or record low interest rates as potential displacement events. Eggertsson and
Krugman (2012a) highlight a deleveraging event as a potential Minsky moment. According to
this hypothesis we should expect to see large swings in the excess return term surrounding dis-
placement and panic events, although the intermediate life of the bubble–the so-called “euphoria”
phase–may exhibit stable growth dynamics not unlike those implied by constant excess return.
Suppose for the time being we wish to propose a model for bubble growth which grows in
expectation at the risk-free rate, but also exhibits the cyclical nature of volatility suggested by
Minsky. To be clear, suppose bubble growth follows a stochastic volatility process of the form:
Bt+1
Bt







ht+1 = µ+ φht + z
h
t+1
where zBt+1 and z
h
t+1 are independent white noise processes, ht represents the log-volatility of the
bubble growth process, and Rft ≡ exp {rt} is the real risk-free rate. The conditional expectation





= Rft = 1/Et [exp {mt,t+1}]. Thus this
formulation is still in the class of models considered by e.g. Blanchard and Watson (1982b) and
models for which Covt
(
exp {mt,t+1} , Bt+1Bt
)
= 0. Furthermore, this formulation bears attractive
qualities to the theoretical rational bubble literature such as stochastic growth and partial collapse
(Martin and Ventura 2012b; Gali 2014b).
Suppose that the innovations to bubble growth zBt and the innovations to the aggregate states εt
are contemporaneously correlated with parameter ρ. Thus, conditional on the realization of εt, zBt
is distributed
zBt | εt ∼ N (ρεt, 1− ρ′ρ)
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which further implies that the bubble growth process may be written
Bt+1
Bt














ht+1 = µ+ φht + z
h
t+1
where z̄Bt+1 is an independent white noise process. This framework resembles the stochastic
volatility-in-mean model of Koopman and Uspensky (2002), with the exception that it exhibits
time-varying leverage according to the term ρ′εt+1. This implies, for instance, that a highly volatile
bubble may induce greater speculative euphoria during prosperous times and greater panic during
recessions than during periods of moderate aggregate prosperity.
However, this formulation is not complete. In the context of the essentially affine term structure
model from Section 3.2.3, innovations to the stochastic discount factor are state-weighted linear
combinations of innovations to the aggregate states. When bubble growth is correlated with aggre-
gate states, it is in general correlated with the stochastic discount factor. The covariance between







































The proof is left to appendix C.1.4. Thus, augmenting equation (3.13) with equation (3.14), the
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full model for bubble growth becomes:
Bt+1
Bt




























1− ρ′ρz̄Bt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
stochastic volatility
(3.15)
ht+1 = µ+ φht + z
h
t+1
Expected bubble growth is governed by the real risk-free rate and an expected bubbly excess
return which depends on lagged aggregate states (via λt) and lagged volatility. The realized bubble
growth rate is also affected by a stochastic volatility-in-mean term with time-varying leverage
dependent on innovations to the aggregate states. Consider a generic shock to latent factor 2
(interest rate policy) or factor 3 (leverage policy). The shock would have a contemporaneous effect
on the size of the bubble through the time-varying leverage term. Furthermore, propagation of
the shock through the aggregate states over time will be priced in both the real risk-free rate and
the expected bubbly excess return terms. These impulse responses represent non-linear effects
to the bubble growth rate, which implies potentially super-linear effects on the magnitude of the
bubble through time. Small policy shocks have the potential for large, compounded effects on the
magnitude of the bubble.
I use Bayesian methods to estimate the joint posterior distribution of parameters
θ ≡ [µ, φ, σh, ρ′, σu] and the latent states B1:T and h1:T . Specifically I use the Particle Marginal
Metropolis Hastings algorithm of Andrieu, Doucet, and Holenstein (2010) with the tempered boot-
strap particle filter of Herbst and Schorfheide (2019) and Metropolis-in-Gibbs techniques. Further
details are available in appendix C.2.
3.3 Results
In this section I present the results of the estimation routine presented in section 3.2.5 and
appendix C.2. I first present evidence of the internal validity of the model in estimating the quantity
Vt − V ft , where V
f





































Figure 3.6: Parsing the observed S&P 500 price (solid, black line) into model-implied fundamental
value (blue fill) and filtered bubble component (orange fill). The fundamental is calculated using
the method in Section 3.2.4 as the sum of an infinite stream of discounted future dividends, ac-
counting for a fundamental equity premium. The bubble portion is filtered from the remaining
observed price level net-fundamental according to the strategy in Section 3.2.5. Shaded vertical
bars represent bubble episodes identified in Phillips et al. (2015).
nature of bubbly excess return and its relationship to macroeconomic fundamentals.
Table C.3 presents the assumed prior distributions and marginal posterior distributions for the
parameters governing equation (3.15). The prior distribution for φ is a well known approach for
limiting the support to (0, 1), which is a necessary constraint for a stationary log-volatility distribu-
tion. The observed cyclical nature of price volatility suggests the autoregressive persistence of the
log-volatility should be positive. Similarly, the correlation between bubble growth innovations and
aggregate state innovations ρ is constrained to the R4 hypercube, with the correlation to observed
aggregate factors assumed to be zero. The prior distribution of the initial bubble magnitude is as-
sumed to be log-normal in order to ensure it lies in R+. Additionally, the initial log-volatility was
assumed to be drawn from the stationary distribution associated with it, as derived from equation
(3.15). Finally, the prior distributions for µ and σh were chosen to be relatively uninformative.
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Figure 3.6 shows the decomposition of the observed S&P 500 price (solid, black) into funda-
mental (fill, blue) and bubble (fill, orange) portions. The bubble portion represents the median










. The fundamental portion is calculated according to Section 3.2.4. The
median bubble series matches the observed S&P 500 price very closely. Bubbly periods estimated
in Phillips et al. (2015) are shown in vertical gray bars. A curious result of their study is the inabil-
ity to identify the mid-2000s run up to the Great Recession as a bubbly episode. This is because,
as seen in the price-dividend ratio in Figure 3.5, prices and dividends seem to be growing at an
equivalent rate. The price-dividend ratio remained relatively constant after the dot-com bubble pe-
riod and leading into the Great Recession. However, my model identifies a significant magnitude
for the bubble during this period along with an incomplete bursting during the dot-com crash in the
spirit of Evans (1991). This suggests that the bubbly period leading up to the Great Recession may
have been driven by leverage channels in the fashion of Jorda et al. (2015). As shown in Table C.3,
the correlation ρ3 between innovations to bubble growth and innovations to the leverage factor is
the largest in absolute magnitude of the four correlations. Ex-ante, following conventional rational
bubble theory, we should have expected the correlation to be highest with the interest rate factor
ρ2.
The likelihood hypersurface is extremely jagged, with large swaths of the parameter space lead-
ing to infeasible results and pockets of the feasible parameter space exhibiting rapid changes in the
likelihood. The length of the filter in the time dimension as well as the sensitivity of the model to
small changes in parameter values lead to very tight estimates for marginal posterior distributions.
Figure (3.7) shows the estimated time-series for the S&P 500 index real bubble component and
the corresponding bubble growth rate. In the top panel, the estimated bubble magnitude is given
by the solid line, with 90-10 credibility bounds shaded. The deviation of observed price from
estimated fundamental as calculated in section (3.2.4) is given by the dashed line. As with the
parameter posteriors, the marginal distributions of the estimated bubble magnitude in each time
period exhibit low variance. The model in equation (3.15) evidently matches the data quite well,





































































Figure 3.7: Results for the estimation of bubble magnitude and bubble growth according to the
model presented in section (3.2.5). The top panel depicts the estimated time series of the bubble
component in the S&P 500 index. The solid line is the estimated time series with 90-10 credibility
bounds shaded. The dotted line represents the observed price’s deviation from the fundamental
value as calculated in section (3.2.4). The bottom panel presents the estimated bubble growth rate
(solid line) with 90-10 credibility bounds shaded. For comparison, the estimated (time-varying)
real risk-free rate is given by the dotted line.
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during which large swings in the bubble growth rate are required to make moderate changes to
bubble magnitude. The lower panel of figure (3.7) plots the estimated bubble growth rate (solid)
with shaded 90-10 credibility bounds and the estimated real risk free rate according to equation
(3.7).
As is typical in the finance literature, the stochastic log-volatility is estimated to be highly
persistent, with a median of φ = 0.941. The unconditional standard deviation of innovations
to bubble growth zBt evaluated at the median values for µ, φ, and σh is 0.069. This means a
positive (negative) standard deviation shock to the bubble growth rate can inflate (deflate) the
bubble by an additional 7% points. This effect is economically significant when the bubble is
large26. Furthermore, the standard deviation of the short-term arbitrage opportunities is σu =
15.05.
Figure 3.8 shows the possible impact macroprudential policy can have on the growth of a
bubble. The top panel shows the estimated bubble growth rate, normalized so that a value of
zero corresponds to a constant bubble. Because the real risk free rate in each period is of order
tens of basis points, I also consider this panel a plot of the full estimated bubbly excess return.
Units are in percentage points and 90-10 credibility bounds are shaded. The next two panels show
the bubbly excess return decomposed according to equation (3.15). The middle panel shows the
expected portion of this excess return which is driven by lagged volatility and lagged aggregate
states. The bottom panel shows the unexpected component of the bubbly excess return as driven
by the stochastic volatility-in-mean and stochastic volatility terms. The first stylized fact to note
is that the traditional assumption that the bubble grows at the risk free rate is broadly appropriate
during periods of steady bubble growth, for instance in the period 1995-2007. Fluctuations about
the real risk free rate are estimated to be small in magnitude. However, the periods 1985-1990
and 2008-2012 lend credence to Minsky’s theory of displacement events which drive rapid bubble
growth or collapse. When the bubble is nascent, as in 1985-1990, large fluctuations are needed to
26For instance, at the peak of the dot-com bubble period in August 2000 the bubble magnitude is $800. The
observed price is $1095. A one standard deviation negative shock to the bubble would imply a $56 (5.1%) reduction
in the observed price month-over-month. In perspective, the mean monthly absolute change in the observed S&P 500









































Figure 3.8: Decomposition of bubble growth according to equation (3.15). The top panel shows
the full, estimated bubble growth series where a value of zero represents a constant bubble. The
middle panel shows the expected bubbly excess return component, which is a function of lagged
states and volatility. The bottom panel shows the unexpected innovations to bubble growth as
driven by the stochastic volatility-in-mean and stochastic volatility terms. Units are in percentage
points and the 90-10 credibility bounds are shaded.
kick start the bubble. In line with the displacement theory, the majority of these growth fluctuations
are due to a series of large, positive innovations to the bubble, rather than priced expectations. The
fallout of the Great Recession is also characterized by rapid swings in bubble growth, dominated
by the unpriced innovations channel.
Variation in the bubble growth is dominated by the unexpected channel for the majority of the
time window. This implies that shocks to aggregate states, the effect of which is absorbed in the
unexpected channel, have large effects on the evolution of the bubble compared to rational pric-
ing.27 Furthermore, the impact of a shock to the leverage factor relative to shocks to other factors




. This suggests that policymakers should
27As is shown in Appendix C.1.5, relative unpredictability of bubble growth has implications for the predictability
of equity returns. Equity return volatility is monotonically increasing in bubble growth volatility.
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begin to seriously consider the leverage channel as a vehicle for macroprudential policy. However,
a necessary tool for quantitatively evaluating its effectiveness has largely been unavailable in the
context of rational bubbles. In the next section I will describe how my model provides this tool.
3.4 Impulse Response Functions
In this section I present impulse responses of the S&P 500 bubble magnitude and bubble growth
to a interest rate policy shock and to a leverage shock. Due to the state-dependent and nonlinear
nature of the bubble growth equation, I present twenty randomly chosen start dates to suggest
qualitative similarities independent of the starting economic climate. I then present a randomly
chosen one of the twenty to present credibility bounds.
To evaluate the effectiveness of an abstract macroprudential policy on bubble magnitude and
bubble growth, policymakers require a quantitative tool. The model presented in this paper lends
itself nicely to impulse response analysis, although the techniques standard to structural vector
autoregressions do not apply. In particular, the responses of the bubble growth rate (and thereby the
bubble magnitude) to aggregate state shocks are nonlinear functions of the states and furthermore
are state-dependent. To address this difficulty, I use the generalized impulse response function of
Koop et al. (1996). This is a bootstrapped method for obtaining impulse response functions in the
context of nonlinear, multivariate systems. Furthermore, because the impulse response functions
are state-dependent, I will present twenty randomly selected start dates to suggest the qualitative
similarities of the responses across initial economic climates.28
Figure 3.9 shows the response of bubble growth (top) and bubble magnitude (bottom) to a
contractionary structural interest rate policy shock via the second latent factor. The magnitude of
the shock is equivalent to one-tenth the standard deviation of the Effective Federal Funds Rate,
or two basis points. The twenty randomly selected start dates are given on the left panel. It is
clear at a glance that all twenty starting points exhibit qualitatively identical dynamics: (1) an
initial increase in the bubble magnitude and growth on incidence, followed by a secondary, further
28These impulse response functions were calculated assuming the median values of model parameters and bubble
and volatility vectors. For fully correct standard errors, the impulse response functions should be calculated for each











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































increase in the bubble growth rate the next period. Afterward, the effect on the bubble growth rate
slowly diminishes. However, a key point to note is that it remains a strictly positive effect until
disappearing. This means that the bubble magnitude converges to a level permanently above the
no-shock regime. The bottom left panel shows this effect for the twenty start dates. This finding
confirms the predictions of Gali (2014b) and Gali and Gambetti (2015) that contractionary interest
rate policy operates opposite as intended and increases the bubble growth rate. This presents a
strong argument against the leaning-against-the-wind policy viewpoint.
If conventional interest rate policy is counterproductive in managing the size of an asset price
bubble, then what macroprudential tools could a central bank use instead? One potential tool
which has begun to circulate the literature is the notion of leverage tightening. This could take a
number of forms: (1) a tax on speculation, (2) increased required reserves, (3) more stringent risk-
assessment and portfolio monitoring practices, (4) tighter collateral requirements, among others.
The results in table C.3 suggest that leverage may be an effective lever for policymakers to manage
the size of the bubble.
Figure 3.10 shows the response of bubble growth (top) and bubble magnitude (bottom) to a
structural leverage tightening shock via the third latent factor. The magnitude of the shock is equal
to one-tenth the standard deviation of the CONSPI (non-revolving consumer credit to personal
income ratio) ratio, or one basis point. The twenty randomly selected start dates are given on the
left panel. Contrary to the contractionary interest rate policy shock, the leverage tightening shock
performs as intended. There is a large, negative impact on incidence on the bubble magnitude and
bubble growth, which is slowly mean-reverting. This dynamic is qualitatively identical across the
randomly chosen start dates. This dynamic is in line with the literature on deleveraging shocks
distinct from the rational bubble literature.29
3.5 Conclusion
This paper presents a model of asset price fundamentals and bubble growth which match ob-
served price dynamics extremely closely. Wedding the essentially affine term structure approach of
29e.g., Eggertsson and Krugman (2012a)
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Ang and Piazzesi (2003) to the rational bubble literature with a particle filter methodology yields
encouraging results. Furthermore, the introduction of a “bubbly excess return” innovates beyond
the traditional rational bubble empirical literature and brings the empirical thinking more closely in
line with modern rational bubble theory. Bubble growth is shown to be more reactive than proac-
tive, in that the magnitude of unexpected bubbly excess returns – via aggregate state surprises and
sentiment shocks – is in general larger than the corresponding period’s expected bubbly excess
returns. This implies a rich environment for the use of macroprudential policy.
The model provides a straightforward environment to produce impulse response functions and
other counterfactual narratives. In particular, I find that the response of bubble growth to contrac-
tionary structural interest rate policy shocks is in line with the predictions of Gali (2014b) and Gali
and Gambetti (2015) such that it inflates the bubble on average. In contrast, leverage tightening
policy performs as intended: deflating the bubble on incidence. Many other counterfactuals could
be asked using this framework. For instance, the selection of four latent, aggregate factors could
be relaxed in favor of including other potential macroprudential tools. This would monotonically
improve the predictive power for dividends and the stochastic discount factor.
Furthermore, this model framework could be utilized to parse bubble value in any combination
of assets within the class of dividend-producing assets. For instance, this framework could be used
to examine the housing industry, with appropriate adjustments to account for the imprecise nature
of dividends in the industry. I leave this question for future research.
Finally, this model is silent on the feedback effects of rational bubbles to macroeconomic fun-
damentals. For a serious welfare-based evaluation of macroprudential policy in the face of rational
bubbles, this feedback should be modeled. There are a number of dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium models30 which satisfy these requirements, but do not provide the flexibility in matching
observed price dynamics presented here. Future work is needed to combine these two features.





Proof of Proposition 1.








, ∀ T ≤ t ≤ T + s∗ − 1. (A.1)
Substitute (A.1) into aggregate capital’s motion:
















t kt, ∀ T ≤ t ≤ T + s∗ − 1,














whose recursion leads to (1.13). Combined with (A.1), this implies (1.14). The rest of part
1 follows straightforwardly.
2. The definition of definition of s∗ and (2.10) imply:
s∗ = min{s ≥ 0|wfT+s(kT+s) ≥ wT+s}
where wfT+s(kT+s) ≡ (1−α)kαT+s is the wage associated with full-employment given capital
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kT+s. Equivalently:
s∗ = min{s ≥ 0|(1− α)kαT+s ≥ γskb}.
Combining with (1.13) yields:
s∗ = min{s ≥ 0|γ−(1−α)
s(s+1)
2 ηαs ≥ γs},
which leads to (2.45). Finally, (1.16) follows from (1.13) and (2.45).
Proof of Corollary 2. Immediate consequences of (1.6), (1.16) and (2.45).





,∀s ≥ 0, (A.2)
or equivalently:












































B.1 Appendix: Omitted Proofs
B.1.1 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. For workers, define ∆W ≡ Wb −Wn. From (2.46) and (2.47):
∆W =
log ((1− α)Kαb )
1− ρβ








∗) + Γ1 (s
∗) logKb)






















log ((1− α)Kαb )
1− ρβ


















α (1− β)2 + β (1− ρ) (α− β)
(1− ρβ) (1− β)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 if ρ<ρ̄
(logKb − logKn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
If the bubble is sufficiently risky, so that
ρ < ρ̄ ≡ 1− α (1− β)
2
β (β − α)
,
then the ratio above is negative, implying limγ→1 ∆W < 0. Thus, there exists γw < 1 such that if
γ > γ1 and ρ < ρ̄, then Wb < Wn.
90
For entrepreneurs, we similarly define ∆V ≡ Vb − Vn. From (A6) and (A9) of the Online
Appendix and by taking γ → 1, we can derive the following limit:
lim
γ→1
∆V = G(φ) (B.1)


























(1− β)(1− βρ)(β + θ)
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Since in equilibrium φ > 0, it follows that limγ→1 ∆V < 0. Thus, there exists γe < 1 such that if
γ > γe, then Vb < Vn. The proof is complete by letting γ̄ = max{γw, γe}.
B.1.2 Proof of Corollary 9
Proof. First, we show that there exists γe < 1 such that if γ > γe, then Vb(τ) ≤ Vn for all τ ≤ τ̄ ,
with equality if and only if τ = τ̄ . Fix any τ < τ̄ . By applying the same algebraic manipulations
as in Section B.1.1, we have limγ→1 Vb(τ) − Vn = G̃(φ(τ)), where G̃ is a decreasing function of
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Since in equilibrium φ (τ) > 0, it follows that limγ→1 Vb(τ) − Vn = G̃(φ(τ)) < 0. Thus, for all
ε > 0, there exists γ(ε) < 1 such that Vb(τ) − Vn < G̃(φ(τ)) + ε whenever γ > γ(ε). By letting
ε = −G̃(φ(τ)) and γe = γ(−G̃(φ(τ))), we then get Vb(τ) < Vn for all γ > γe, as desired. Finally,
note that when τ = τ̄ , the bubble disappears, i.e., φ(τ̄) = 0, and thus Vb(τ̄) = Vn.
Similarly, we show that there exists γw < 1 such that if γ > γw and ρ < ρ̄, then Wb(τ) ≤ Wn
for all τ ≤ τ̄ , with equality if and only if τ = τ̄ . Fix any τ < τ̄ . If Kb(τ) ≤ Kn, i.e., the taxed
bubble is contractionary, then it is obvious that the welfare of workers cannot be better off with
the bubble than without, as the equilibrium wage in the bubbly equilibrium path would always be
smaller than wn – the wage in the bubbleless steady state. Thus, we can focus on the expansionary
case of Kb(τ) > Kn. By applying the same algebraic manipulations as in Section B.1.1, we get
lim
γ→1
Wb(τ)−Wn = H(τ) ≡
α (1− β)2 + β (1− ρ) (α− β)
(1− ρβ) (1− β)2
(logKb(τ)− logKn) ,
where the right-hand side H(τ) is strictly negative whenever ρ < ρ̄. Thus, for all ε > 0, there
exists γ(ε) such that Wb(τ) −Wn < H(τ) + ε. By letting ε = −H(τ) and γw = γ(−H(τ)), we
then get Wb(τ) < Wn for all γ > γw, as desired. Finally, when τ = τ̄ , the bubble disappears and
thus trivially Wb(τ̄) = Wn.
The proof is complete by letting γ̄ = max{γw, γe}, as it is immediate from the results above
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that arg maxτ≤τ̄ λWb(τ) + (1− λ)Vb(τ) = τ̄ when γ > γ̄ and ρ < ρ̄.
B.1.3 Proof of Proposition 10
First, we show inflation is at target and employment is full in the period the bubble collapses:
Lemma 13. ΠT−1,T = Π∗ and LT = 1.
Proof. Recall the economy is still in the bubbly steady state in T − 1, and therefore the nominal
interest rate iT−1,T is determined by the unconstrained Taylor rule 1 + iT−1,T = RbΠ∗. Also recall
the Fisher equation that equates the expected return from nominal bond holding and real lending
for entrepreneurs below the threshold āb:
1 + iT−1,T =
ρu′(cLb )RbΠ
∗ + (1− ρ)u′(cLT )RT−1,TΠT−1,T
ρu′(cLb ) + (1− ρ)u′(cLT )
,
where the superscript L denotes entrepreneurs with productivity below āb. Here, we have used the
fact that in the good state that the bubble persists in period T (which happens with probability ρ),
the economy continues to be in the bubbly steady state with consumption level cLb for the L-type,
the real interest rate is Rb, and inflation is Π∗. The indifference condition above implies:
RbΠ
∗ = RT−1,TΠT−1,T .






























However, this violates assumption (2.55).
Therefore, it must be that LT = 1. Equation (B.2) then implies ΠT−1,T = 1.
Now the proof for the proposition follows straightforwardly:
Proof. Given ΠT−1,T = Π∗, it is immediate that (2.56) is equivalent to
RfT,T+1Π
∗ < 1.





as the post-bubble economy follows the bubbleless dynamics. In addition, from the law of motion
of capital, we have KT+1 = αAnKαTL1−αT = αAnKαb . Therefore, R
f
T,T+1Π




, which is equivalent to (2.56).
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B.1.4 Proof of Lemma 11



















Substitute (B.5) into (B.4), we get a condition that the capital stock must be sufficiently high:
Kt ≥ γ0ānα(Kt−1/Lt−1)α.





However, as 1 ≥ Lt−1, it then follows that 1 ≥ γ0a
L
An , which contradicts assumption (2.55).
B.1.5 Proof of Proposition 12
Proof. For notation simplicity, let us normalize the period when the bubble bursts to be period 0;
that is, T = 0. Then, on the unemployment path L1, L2, · · · < 1 and i0,1 = i1,2 = · · · = 0. The
unemployment path can be characterized as follows. The flow of capital is given by
Kt = AnαKαt−1L1−αt−1 .
95




































































These expressions can be further simplified by recursively plugging in for Lt−1, Lt−2, . . . , L1.
Therefore, labor, Lt, can be written as a function of L0 = 1 (as shown in Appendix B.1.3, there is
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Similarly, using the flow of capital equation and working backward, Kt can be written as a


































For these values to constitute an equilibrium path after the collapse of the bubble in period
T , the necessary and sufficient conditions are that the DNWR and the ZLB do indeed bind. From
Proposition 11, we know it is sufficient to show that the ZLB binds, i.e.,Rft−1,t (Πt−2,t−1)
ζ (Π∗)1−ζ <
1 for all t, where the real interest rate with full employment is given by Rft−1,t = ānαK
α−1
t . This










for all t, as stated in the proposition.
Finally, it is algebraically straightforward to show that limt→∞KT+t = K, limt→∞ LT+t = L,
and limt→∞ΠT+t−1,T+t = Π, where K,L, and Π are the capital, labor, and inflation in the bad




The credit market clearing condition is
∫ 1
0









where 1 is the indicator function. Since net worth ejt is a function of past productivity a
j
t−1 and the











which yields (2.18), as stated in the main text. Recall that the CDF for the Pareto distribution over
[1,∞) with shape parameter σ is F (a) = 1 − a−σ. Thus, the solution to equation (2.19) for the







A closed-form expression for An is An = β1−θ
ā1−σn σ
σ−1 . Thus, a closed-form expression for the



















djtdj = 0, we get:





















leading to the steady-state value of āb as in (2.35). The capital accumulation equation is then given
by (2.32).
We now determine Rt,t+1 and Rkt+1. From Proposition 6, we know that the slump only begins
one period after the bubble collapses. That is, even if the bubble collapses in t+ 1, the slump only
begins in t + 2 and the labor market still clears in t + 1, leading to Lt+1 = 1. Hence, the rental






t+1 in period t+ 1, regardless of whether the
bubble collapses or persists in t+ 1. Thus, from the perspective of the marginal investors, both the


























t+1 denote the consumption of entrepreneur j when
the bubble persists and when the bubble collapses in t + 1, respectively. By substituting out the































































































Combining (B.9) and (B.10) yields equation (2.34).
Finally, from the analysis above of the equilibrium dynamics, the bubbly steady state can be
straightforwardly characterized as in the main text.
B.2.3 Welfare functions
The expected lifetime utility of a representative worker in the bubbly equilibrium in each period
t is given by:
Wb(Kt, φt) = log (c
w
t ) + βρWb(Kt+1, φt+1) + β(1− ρ)Wburst(Kt+1)
where the first term is the instantaneous utility, with
cwt = wt = (1− α)Kαt ,
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and the second term is the continuation value conditional on the bubble persisting, and the last
term is the continuation value conditional on the bubble collapsing in t + 1. From Proposition 6,
we can calculate this last term to be:
Wburst(Kt+1) = Γ0 (s






































βs (α− (1− α) s) + β
s∗α (1− (1− α) s∗)
1− β
.
Thus, the worker’s welfare in the bubbly steady state is as given by (2.47).
We now calculate the welfare of entrepreneurs in the bubbleless steady state. Recall from the
main text that in the bubbleless steady state, the lifetime expected utility of an entrepreneur j who
starts the period with a net worth ej , denoted by Vn(ej), satisfies equation (2.48). We solve Vn(·) by
the guess and verify method. We conjecture that Vn(ej) = g0 + g1 logKn + g2 log ej . By plugging






















































































Finally, we compute the welfare of entrepreneurs in the bubbly steady state. Recall that the
lifetime expected utility of an entrepreneur j who starts the period with a net worth ej , denoted by
Vb(e
j), satisfies equation (2.49). From Proposition 6, we can calculate the post-bubble continuation
value as given by:
Vburst(e
j) = κ0 (s


























































































































(1− βρ) (1− β)
× ρ log
(
θ (1− F (āb))





(1− βρ) (1− β)
× (1− ρ) log
(




Under the definition Vb ≡ Vb(
αKαb
1−βφ), we then get:

















B.2.4 Bubble dynamics and steady state with macroprudential tax
In the presence of a macroprudential tax, the equilibrium dynamics are similar to that of the
bubble equilibrium, except that τ will affect the first-order condition with respect to bubbly in-
vestment of entrepreneurs. The indifference condition between investing in the bubbly asset and








′(c̄t+1)Rt,t+1] , if a
j
t < āt,





























This equation gives a new expression that determines the bubble size in the bubbly steady state:














· 1− σ(1− βρ(1− τ)))
θ − σρ (1− θ) (1− τ) + σ (1− τ − θ)
Note how φ is a decreasing function of τ . The bubble exists (φ > 0) if and only if τ < τ̄ ≡ 1− σ−1
βσρ
.



















Similar to the analysis in the main text and Section B.2.3, the duration of the post-bubble slump
is given by (2.45) and the bubbly steady-state welfare expression for workers is given by (2.47),
where we note thatKb = Kb(τ) is now a function of τ . The bubbly steady-state welfare expression
for entrepreneurs is given by Vb ≡ Vb(
αKαb
1−βφ(τ)), where Vb(e
j) is as defined in (B.13), except that
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Γb(s


























(1− βρ) (1− β)
× ρ log










(1− βρ) (1− β)







Following the macroprudential literature (e.g., Bianchi 2011; Bianchi and Mendoza 2018), we
define constrained efficiency as follows. Consider a benevolent social planner who cares about both
entrepreneurs and workers. The planner has restricted planning abilities: it chooses allocations
subject to the resource, implementability, and credit constraints but allows the markets to clear
competitively. Its policy instrument is limited to a constant tax on bubbly speculation. Since prices
remain market-determined, the first-order conditions for private agents enter the planner’s problem
as implementability constraints. The key difference between the planner’s problem and private
agents’ problems is that the planner internalizes how its decisions affect prices.
The implementability constraints for the planner will come from the first-order conditions of








































djt ≤ θ · I
j
t .
It is more convenient to rewrite this problem in the following equivalent form: instead of choosing
the amount of the bubbly asset bjt , each entrepreneur chooses the amount of (before-tax) bubbly
investment Bjt ≡ pbtb
j








































denotes the return on the bubbly asset. In the budget constraint above, we have
also replaced Rkt with the marginal product of capital.





































where Rb,ρt and c
j,ρ
t are the return on the bubbly asset and consumption conditional on the state
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d,t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the
nonnegativity constraints on Ijt and b
j
t and the credit constraint, respectively.
We can now define the planner’s problem:




























where λ ∈ [0, 1] is the Pareto weight the planner assigns to the representative worker and 1− λ is
that for entrepreneurs, subject to the following individual budget constraints:
cwt = FL(Kt, Lt)Lt

















the planner’s transfer being given by:
T jt = τB
j
t ,∀j ∈ J,
credit constraint:
djt ≤ θ · I
j
t ,
implementability constraints (B.15-B.18), and the labor market conditions:
FL(Kt, Lt) ≥ γFL(Kt−1, Lt−1) (B.19)
Lt ≤ 1
(1− Lt)(FL(Kt, Lt)− γFL(Kt−1, Lt−1)) = 0.
As in the main text, we focus on the planner’s problem in the bubbly steady state and assume that
each entrepreneur begins the steady state with the same net worth.
Note that the planner takes as given the exogenous sunspot process of bubble bursting. The
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key thing to notice is that unlike individual agents, the planner internalizes the downward wage
rigidity condition (B.19) in its optimization problem. As a consequence, the first-order conditions
of the planner will contain a Lagrange multiplier associated with this constraint, which would
be otherwise absent in the laissez-faire first-order conditions of individual entrepreneurs. This
formalizes the notion that the competitive equilibrium allocations are constrained inefficient.
B.3 Extension: a generalized model
We now extend the model in several directions. First, we allow for exogenous growth. Specifi-




where the technology term At grows at an exogenous growth rate g ≥ 0:
At ≡ (1 + g)t.











The downward wage rigidity condition is growth-adjusted, meaning:
wt ≥ (1 + g)γwt−1.
Second, we allow for partial capital depreciation. Specifically, we assume that the capital stock
depreciates at a rate δ ∈ [0, 1]. As in Kocherlakota (2009a), we assume that the capital good can
be converted back one-to-one to the consumption good.
Remark 14. The main model in Section 3.2 is a special case of this extended model (where g = 0,
δ = 1, and F is Pareto over [1,∞)). Note further that the calibration exercise in Section 2.4.2 uses
only the first two extended assumptions (i.e., g > 0 and δ < 1).
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The changes compared to the main model are as follows. We first consider the bubbleless





(1− F (ān)) .
The detrended capital stock evolves according to the following new law of motion:









t + (1− δ) kt
)
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The bubbleless steady-state interest rate is:
Rn = ān
(
αkα−1n + 1− δ
)
=






We now consider the bubbly equilibrium. The cutoff threshold is implicitly determined by the
credit-market clearing condition:
F (āt)− φt =
θ
1− θ
· (1− F (āt)) .
The detrended capital stock evolves according to the following new law of motion:





































and the following new expression for the interest rate:
Rb =






where the cutoff threshold āb as given in the main model, and the following new equation that









C.1.1 Rational Bubbles and Risk-Adjusted Martingales





Iterating forward, discounting, and taking expectations leads to the following:




+ Et [exp {mt,t+1}Bt+1] (C.2)





+ Et [exp {mt,t+1}Dt+1] + Et [exp {mt,t+1}Bt+1]






+ Et [exp {mt,t+1}Bt+1] (C.3)

































































= V ft (C.4)
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Thus inserting equation (C.4) into equation (C.3), we reach the final result:
Bt = Et [exp {mt,t+1}Bt+1]
C.1.2 Pricing Equities
Recall from equation (3.4) that the price-dividend ratio of a dividend-producing asset can be









I begin the proof by showing that q1,t may be written as an exponential-affine function of the
aggregate states q1,t = exp {c1 + C ′1St}:



























× Et [exp {−λ′tεt+1 + e′∆d (ΓSSt + ΣSεt+1)}]
= exp
{












× Et [exp {(e′∆dΣS − λ′t) εt+1}]
Using the normality of εt+1,


































× exp {− (e′r − e′πΓs)St + e′∆dΓSSt − e′∆dΣsλ1St}













C ′1 = − (e′r − e′πΓs) + e′∆dΓS − e′∆dΣsλ1






. I will prove that qn,t =

















































λ′tλt − λ′tεt+1 + (Cn−1 + e∆d)
′ St+1
}]
Following the same algebraic logic as with q1,t, one can show that indeed qn,t = exp {cn + C ′nSt},
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where











s (Cn−1 + e∆d)− (Cn−1 + e∆d)
′Σsλ0
C ′n = − (e′r − e′πΓs) + (Cn−1 + e∆d)
′ (Γs − Σsλ1)








cn + (Cn − e∆d)′ St
}










sCn−1 − C ′n−1Σsλ0
C ′n = − (e′r − e∆d − e′πΓs) + C ′n−1 (Γs − Σsλ1)
C.1.3 Equity Premium
Expected return on zero-coupon bonds
Recall that the real price of an n−period zero-coupon bond follows pn,t = an + (An + eπ)′ St.





= Et [exp {pn−1,t+1 − pn,t}]
= exp
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s (An−1 + eπ)
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Expected return on equities
First, recall that the period-over-period expected return on holding a fundamental unit of an

















Et [(1 + vdt+1) exp {e′∆dSt+1}]


















Et [exp {cn + C ′nSt+1}]
Evaluating the expectation term using log-normality of aggregate states leads to












































Figure C.1: The term structure of the equity risk premium paid to the S&P 500 index relative
to U.S. treasury securities at the 3M, 6M, 1Y, 5Y, and 10Y maturity lengths. The equity risk
premium is defined as the expected difference between period-over-period returns to the S&P 500
and treasury securities, as defined in equations (C.5) and (C.6). Units are in basis points. Results
are derived using aggregate state and model parameters estimated in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.




























n=0 exp {cn + (Cn − e∆d)St}
(C.6)
Expected equity premium




for a given equity-maturity compar-
ison, which is the expected difference in the period-over-period returns. It is immediately evident
that the model presented accounts for some amount of equity premium. Figure C.1 shows the
model-implied term structure of the S&P 500 equity premium with respect to the five U.S. gov-
ernment bonds noted. The equity premium is denominated in basis points. Consider the observed
period-over-period return of a dividend-producing equity which features a bubble in its observed











































S&P 500 Fundamental Equity Premium
Model
Data
Figure C.2: Model-implied equity premium of the S&P 500 index relative to the 1Y U.S. T-bond
(solid, blue) and the Implied Equity Premium of Damodaran (2019) (dashed, black). Data are
represented monthly from Sep 2008 to Aug 2018 and are denominated in basis points.














. The reverse should also hold. When expected bubble growth is below
the fundamental equity premium, we would expect the observed equity premium to understate
the fundamental equity premium. If no bubble were to exist, estimates of the observed equity
premium should closely match those implied by the model. Figure C.2 shows the model-implied
fundamental equity premium for the S&P 500 compared to the 1Y U.S. T-bond (solid, blue) and
the Implied Equity Premium as calculated by Damodaran (2019) (dashed, black). For much of the
post-Great Recession period, the observed equity premium overstates the model-implied equity
premium, suggesting the presence of a bubble growing at a rate faster than the fundamental equity
premium (which is 3.2% MoM on average for this period Sep 2008 to Aug 2018).
C.1.4 Bubbly Excess Return
In the essentially affine term structure model, the stochastic discount factor takes the following
form:
mt,t+1 = −rt −
1
2
λ′tλt − λ′tεt+1 (C.7)
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Begin by using equations (C.7) and (3.12):






































































Because of the normality assumptions for εt+1, ht+1, and zBt+1; the random variable Ft+1 fol-
lows a normal log-normal mixture distribution. The method for solving the first moment of this
distribution is shown in Yang (2008), and is re-derived here. Define Gt+1 ≡ −λ′tεt+1 + 12σhht+1,


























We can then define the conditional distribution











Then the first moment for Ft+1 follows:












































The final expectation term is the first conditional moment of yet another normal log-normal mixture















































Plugging this result back into equation (C.9), we have














































Recall from equation (3.11) the definition for the excess return to holding the bubble asset:
Et [Bt+1/Bt] − Rft = −Covt
(
exp {mt,t+1} , Bt+1Bt
)
/Et [exp {mt,t+1}]. Furthermore, recall from




























C.1.5 Predictability of Equity Returns
Recall from Campbell and Shiller (1988) that the equity return for a dividend-producing asset
may be log-linearized to the form
ret+1 ≈ κ0 + κ1vdt+1 − vdt + ∆dt+1 (C.11)
where κ0 and κ1 are functions of the deterministic steady state price-dividend ratio and vd ≡
ln V
D
represents the log price-dividend ratio. Assuming that there is a similar deterministic steady
state decomposition of the full price, log-linearization of equation (3.10) leads to the following
relationship:
vdt ≈ ρvdft + (1− ρ) bdt (C.12)
where ρ ≡ V f
V
is the steady state fundamental value to full value ratio, vdf ≡ ln V f
D
, and bd ≡ ln B
D
.
Inserting (C.12) into (C.11) leads to the following relationship:






+ (1− ρ)κ1bdt+1 − (1− ρ) bdt
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+ (1− ρ)κ1 (bdt+1 − Et [bdt+1])︸ ︷︷ ︸
bubble discount rate news
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C.2 Estimation Strategy
The goal of this section is to develop an empirical methodology which can filter the time series
vector B1:T from the quantity V ∗1:T = V1:T − V
f
1:T subject to the growth dynamics developed in
section (3.2.5). The target therefore is the posterior density p (B1:T | V ∗1:T ). However, there are a
number of complications which prevent the direct observation of this posterior. First, the quantities
θ ≡ [σ2u, µ, φ, σh, ρ] and h1:T are unknown. Conditional on these quantities, the posterior density
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p (B1:T , h1:T | V ∗1:T , θ) would be straightforward to calculate with a Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC)
algorithm. Conversely, the posterior density p (θ | V ∗1:T , B1:T , h1:T ) could be easily calculated using
a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) technique. However, because all of the quantities are
unknown, the target density must be a joint posterior p (B1:T , h1:T , θ | V ∗1:T ), which is a nontrivial
exercise. Furthermore, it is a well-known issue with stochastic volatility models that an analytical
likelihood function does not generically exist. Thus the likelihood function must be approximated
in some consistent manner.
The Particle Marginal Metropolis Hastings (PMMH) algorithm proposes breaking the target
joint posterior into intermediate densities which are more readily estimable (Andrieu et al. (2010)).
For instance, one can write the target joint density as
p (B1:T , h1:T , θ | V ∗1:T ) =
p (B1:T , h1:T , V
∗
1:T | θ) π (θ)
p (V ∗1:T )
=
p (B1:T , h1:T | θ, V ∗1:T ) p (V ∗1:T | θ) π (θ)
p (V ∗1:T )
A full MCMC sampler designed to target this joint posterior would be infeasible, because the
proposal distribution would be of dimension Θ × RT+ × RT where θ ∈ Θ. The innovation in the
PMMH algorithm is that one can use an SMC algorithm (such as the particle filter) to approximate
the proposed posterior density p (B′1:T , h
′
1:T | θ′, V ∗1:T ) (where prime notation implies the proposed
set of new parameters) for use in a Metropolis Hastings proposal kernel given by
q (B′1:T , h
′
1:T , θ
′ | B1:T , h1:T , θ) = q (θ′ | θ) p (B′1:T , h′1:T | θ′, V ∗1:T )
q (θ′ | θ) is an econometrician-chosen proposal kernel density. Conveniently, this framework leads
to a simple Metropolis-Hastings algorithm in which (1) a guess for θ is made according to a user-
defined Markov kernel, (2) the marginal likelihood p (V ∗1:T | θ) is approximated using a particle
filter to integrate out B1:T and h1:T , and (3) a Metropolis-Hastings step is performed with accep-
tance probability dependent on the ratio of priors, q (θ′ | θ), and marginal likelihoods.
The PMMH framework requires a selection of an SMC algorithm for approximating the marginal
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likelihood and filtering the latent quantitiesB1:T and h1:T as well as an MCMC algorithm. I choose
for the SMC algorithm the tempered bootstrap particle filter of Herbst and Schorfheide (2019),
which has the added benefit of removing the need to estimate the measurement error variance σ2u.
Instead, each time-step of the particle filter is reweighted progressively using bridge distributions
until a target measurement error variance is achieved or a target inefficiency ratio is achieved. Thus
in each time period the measurement error variance is adaptive. In the context of their notation,
I chose φ1,t = 0.001, r∗ = 1.2, c∗ = 0.1 (using their proposed adaptation function), NMH = 1,
and Σu = 100. I used 100, 000 particles for the filter, condensing them down to 240 backward
simulations.
C.3 Data
As mentioned in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, data for aggregate states and the term structure of
U.S. treasury securities were drawn from the FRED-MD monthly database (McCracken and Ng
(2015)). The omitted variables are as follows: ACOGNO, S&P 500, S&P: INDU.S.T, S&P DIV
YIELD, S&P PE RATIO, and UMCSENTx. Variables were transformed according to the data
appendix in McCracken and Ng (2015), with the exception of CPIAUCSL which was transformed
according to code 5 to represent log inflation. Additionally, I obtained the Fama-French market
excess return, High-Minus-Low, and Small-Minus-Big factors as well as the market risk free rate
from Kenneth French (Fama and French (1993)) and the real S&P 500 price and dividend growth
from Robert Shiller (Shiller (2006)). Data are collected monthly, and I retained the period January
1985 - August 2018 for estimation. All of the above data sources are publicly available.
Table C.1 gives summary statistics for the main series used in section 3.2.2 and which are
subsequently useful for discussing impulse response analysis. For instance, I calibrate the contrac-
tionary interest rate policy impulse to one-tenth of a standard deviation change in the FEDFUNDS
series, or 1.94bp.
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Series Mean Std Dev Min Max
∆dt 0.0026 0.007 -0.0301 0.0229
rnt 0.0027 0.0021 0 0.0079
πt 0.0009 0.0011 -0.0078 0.0059
INDPRO 0.0007 0.0027 -0.0192 0.0088
FEDFUNDS -0.016 0.1942 -0.96 0.87
CONSPI 0.0001 0.0011 -0.006 0.0088
TWEXMMTH -0.0004 0.0075 -0.0234 0.0281
Table C.1: Selected summary statistics for time series used to estimate the model in section 3.2.2.
The top panel lists the observed factors Zt. The bottom panel lists the series used to name each
of the latent aggregate factors Xt in the order in which they are listed in Yt. Summary statistics
are presented after transforming the variables. rnt is the nominal risk free rate as represented by




Regressor X1 X2 X3 X4 ∆d rn π X1 X2 X3 X4
X1 -0.002 0.284 -0.017 -0.002 -47.624 161.297 25.267 0.852
X2 0.400 0.629 0.068 -0.005 33.336 -203.672 130.347 0.089 0.219
X3 -0.128 0.033 0.926 -0.020 -7.764 -8.910 124.366 -0.100 -0.002 0.025
X4 -0.118 -0.052 9.3e-05 0.984 0.325 7.328 -19.363 0.047 0.011 0.030 0.025
[Σs]−3,−3
∆d 5.1e-05 3.0e-04 -1.1e-04 -4.0e-05 0.835 -0.141 1.134 0.004
rn 1.7e-05 2.2e-05 1.0e-05 5.2e-07 0.001 0.976 0.044 1.4e-06 4.1e-04
π 1.2e-05 -1.4e-05 2.4e-05 1.9e-05 0.021 0.126 0.464 -6.1e-04 9.2e-06 7.8e-04
Table C.2: Selected point estimates from FAVAR specification as depicted in section (3.2.2). The
model may be summarized by two equations: (1) Yt = [Λx Λz]St+ηt and (2) St = ΓsSt−1 + Σsεt.
[·]i,j represents the first i rows and j columns of the matrix in brackets. −i and−j represent the last
i rows and j columns. X1 . . . X4 are estimated latent factors using Bai et al. (2016) and are shown
in figure (3.2). ∆d represents real log dividend growth of the S&P 500 index, rn the nominal





µ Normal 0, 5
-0.644
[-0.656, -0.461]
φ Beta 1, 1
0.941
[0.936, 0.954]




ρ1 Truncated Normal 0, 0.5, -1, 1
0.046
[0.040, 0.097]
ρ2 Truncated Normal 0, 0.5, -1, 1
0.049
[0.038, 0.059]
ρ3 Truncated Normal 0, 0.5, -1, 1
0.321
[0.276, 0.331]




B1 Lognormal 0, 2
4.571
[1.985, 8.840]
h1 Normal µ1− φ, 11− φ
-4.619
[-9.284, -.594]
Table C.3: Marginal prior and posterior distributions for parameters governing the bubble growth
process in equation (3.15). Posterior medians are given with the 10th and 90th percentiles in
braces. Estimates are derived from 1700 Metropolis-Hastings draws from the posterior, discarding
the first 360 and retaining every 20th draw after.
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